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Toward 1987: A "Pre-Constitutional"
Law Case
William F. Swindler
The year 1783 was marked by two major events in the slowly
coalescing constitutional shape of the United States.
One was the final signing at Paris of the definitive treaty
of peace, after more than a year of desultory negotiations
which were finally approved by both Britain and the United
States—and, somewhat reluctantly, by America's quondam
ally, France. Now, finally, the thirteen independent states
under the Articles of Confederation had an official status
among "the powers of the earth"—such as
it was—and could undertake to resume, in the states
at least, the normal functions of government and law which
had been suspended from July of 1776 or earlier.
For different states the period of suspension of normal
operations had been one of various lengths. Virginia,
for example, eventually declared a moratorium on certain
proceedings, such as statutes of limitations affecting
a number of types of legal actions, for a period beginning
April 12, 1774 to September 3, 1783. The earlier date
marked the closing of the last colonial legislative session
by the last royal governor. The latter date was the date
of the signing of the Treaty of Paris. For the national
government, on the other hand, the treaty ratified the
status of the United States as a government at least theoretically
able to incur international treaty obligations, open formal
diplomatic relations with other countries of the world,
and generally to claim sovereign status in the family
of nations. While its standing abroad might be questionable
for another generation, its domestic or "municipal"
authority, as the final arbiter of relations between states,
now was settled. The Articles had set up a national government
of sorts, and the treaty made it a recognized national
entity with the final word on internal affairs.
This led to the other important event of 1783— actually
the formal filing of a report on litigation which had
taken place the previous fall—which was the final
settlement of the "Wyoming Valley" dispute between
the states of Connecticut and Pennsylvania. This, as it
turned out, was to be the only "Constitutional"
case pursued to final judgment under the Articles of Confederation,
and before creation of a national court system under Article
III of the 1787 Constitution. By authority of Article
IX under the Confederation, the Continental Congress was
empowered to create two judicial bodies—a Special
Court of Appeals which heard admiralty cases from the
various state' courts, and ad hoc "legislative courts"
to settle land and border disputes between states.
The judges who met at Trenton, New Jersey in the fall
of 1782 to hear the "Wyoming Valley" dispute
more nearly resembled a border settlement commission.
Of the five members of the tribunal, only two had substantial
professional credentials—David Brearly, chief justice
of New Jersey, and Cyrus Griffin of Virginia, a member
of the appeals court and the first judge-to-be of the
United States District Court for Virginia six years later.
William Whipple, of New Hampshire, although just appointed
to his state's high court, seems to have been a non-lawyer;
and Welcome Arnold, of Rhode Island, certainly was. The
fifth member of the tribunal was William C. Houston of
New Jersey, who had been admitted to the bar in 1781 after
a decade as professor of mathematics at the College of
New Jersey (now Princeton).
Yet this disparate group had a fundamental constitutional
question before it. The Wyoming Valley was a region in
northeastern Pennsylvania, just under the New York border
(see map), between the Susquehannah and Lackawanna Rivers,
claimed by both Connecticut and Pennsylvania under their
respective colonial charters. Such conflicting grants
were not unusual in a time of imperfect knowledge in England
of the areas they were dealing with in the New World.
In any event, Connecticut's 1661 charter was obviously
senior, and when the lavish grants to the Duke of York
cut through the 1662 territory, it left the main government
of Connecticut cut off from two important tracts which
were to figure in its later history.
One of these was in western New York and northernmost
Pennsylvania—the area which historically became
the "Western Reserve," a "resettlement"
area which the colony, in the course of its cession of
its western lands, had kept for the victims of the "firelands,"
burnt-out coastal regions attacked by British warships
in the course of the Revolution. The other was the Wyoming
Valley which was claimed by Connecticut not only by right
of charter but early settlement. The colony even went
so far as to organize this as a county which was entitled
to representation in the assembly in Hartford.
Pennsylvania's counterclaims had not been pursued with
particular vigor up to the time of independence, and it
was actually the events of the war which brought matters
to a head. In 1778 a combined force of Indians and Tories
had launched a campaign against the settlements in the
Wyoming Valley, coming down from the major areas held
by the Six Nations in the central part of New York, the
result being a combined massacre and expulsion of the
settlers from virtually the entire region. The Continental
Congress perceived that the threat could only be removed
by counter-attacks on the Six Nations themselves, and
in due course these areas were destroyed and the Indian
power broken.
As survivors undertook to return to the area from which
they had been driven, Pennsylvania authorities decided
that the question of territoriality had to be settled
at last, and accordingly brought a formal petition to
Congress to establish a special agency to adjudicate the
matter. Congress issued a commission in August 1782 empowering
the special agency to convene, hear and determine the
matter, and on November 12 Justice Isaac Smith of New
Jersey administered the oath to Brearly and Houston, the
first two commissioners to appear. A week later, all the
commissioners had made their way to Trenton and been sworn,
while the phalanx of lawyers for the two states also assembled
with their credentials.
For Connecticut, the three attorneys were Eliphalet Dyer,
William Samuel Johnson and Jesse Root. Pennsylvania was
represented by four lawyers — William Bradford,
Jr., Joseph Reed, Jonathon D. Sergeant and James Wilson,
the state solicitor, Henry Osborne, was also present.
Among these several well-known attorneys, the future Supreme
Court Justice James Wilson was probably the most eminent.
The case began with the usual procedural maneuvers, Connecticut's
counsel challenging the jurisdiction of the Trenton tribunal
and Pennsylvania filing a rebuttal. Connecticut then submitted
a statement that its best evidence, an "original
deed from the Indians... obtained from their chiefs and
sachems at their council fire in Onandaga" in 1763,
was "now in England, left there before the commencement
of the present unhappy war." Insofar as this statement
laid the ground for a motion to postpone the trial of
the issue, Pennsylvania asked the court for a rule to
continue the trial forthwith.
The case in chief, of course, consisted of the original
charters and subsequent documentary evidence establishing
the sovereignty of the particular colony over the area.
Connecticut began with the original 1620 charter of Massachusetts
Bay, from which emanated subsequent grants in 1629 and
1631 creating the settlements of New Haven and Hartford,
leading eventually to the separate charter of April 23,
1662 to "the company and society of the colony of
Connecticut." Trouble began two years later, however,
when Charles II granted to his brother, the Duke of York
and future James II, an area (which Charles intended to
wrest from the Dutch) extending in a corridor between
the Connecticut and Hudson Rivers (including Long Island
and its Connecticut settlements) to the upper reaches
of Chesapeake Bay.
Following a decade in which the area changed hands several
times, it finally went to England by treaty in 1674, with
postwar amendments to the charter of New York and "the
Jerseys" which extended Connecticut's western border
with New York but remained silent on the lands beyond
the upper Delaware river, which Connecticut regarded as
part of its original grant. Typical charter language of
the time began most of these grants at "the western
shores of the Atlantic" (i.e., west from England)
and continued them to "the South seas," a vague
reference to some large body of water which eventually
came to be treated as the Mississippi.
In 1681 Charles granted to William Penn a territory extending
from the Delaware river "westward five degrees in
longitude," the northern border of which was to be
the forty-third degree of latitude and the southern beginning
at the "twelve-mile arc" around Newcastle, Delaware,
and proceeding along the northern border of Maryland.
This language had already created one problem, which was
solved by the famous Mason-Dixon survey authorized by
Lords Penn and Calvert in 1765. As for the northern area,
counsel for Pennsylvania now offered documents of grants
to the "right of soil" made between the proprietors
and various Indian tribes in 1736, added to the fact that
its 1681 charter contained a map indicating clearly that
the grant to Penn extended northward "to the end
of the forty—second degree.
Connecticut's rejoinder declared that in 1753, "having
located and settled all their lands within their patent
east of New York, and being in a condition to extend their
settlements on the other part of their patent aforesaid,
to the westward of the Delaware river," the Susquehannah
Company was chartered as a land development agency—typical
of a number of such projects of the time—and the
following year purchased the "right of soil"
from the Indians claiming title to the region. Connecticut's
counsel apparently were unable to produce original documents
for 1754 and had already admitted that those of 1763 were
not obtainable, and offered instead to submit corroborating
depositions.
The Trenton tribunal thereupon put the two states to their
proofs, and heard testimony for the rest of the year.
On December 30, 1782 the five commissioners gave a unanimous
judgment for Pennsylvania. While they gave no reasons
for their finding, it is pretty clear, first, that the
1664 New York charter and the 1681 Pennsylvania charter,
by failing to reserve any Connecticut interests, extinguished
the latter sub silentio. The additional fact that the
Indian agreement of 1736, apparently touching the territory
in question, antedated the 1754 and 1763 purchases of
Connecticut and its land company, settled the matter.
The jockeying for strategic advantage—including
the creating of a county of Westmoreland representing
the Wyoming Valley area in the Connecticut legislature,
in 1776—was finally ended with this judgment. But
more than five thousand persons held titles to lands issued
by the Susquehannah Company, and it was not until 1799
that Pennsylvania enacted an "act of compromise"
confirming titles in seventeen erstwhile Connecticut townships.
Upon payment of norminal fees to Pennsylvania, the problem
was finally extinguished, and the only complete "constitutional"
case before the Constitution itself was finally closed.
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