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What Heaven Must Be Like: William
Howard Taft as Chief Justice, 1921-30
by Jeffrey B. Morris*
I love judges and I love courts. They are my ideals, that
typify on earth what we shall meet hereafter in heaven
under a just God. —William Howard Taft[1]
* * * * *
* I acknowledge with appreciation the research assistance
of Helena Silverstein, a junior at the University of Pennsylvania.
* * * * * *
No person who ever became Chief Justice yearned for that
office more than William Howard Taft. No man to chair
the supreme committee of nine did so with greater love.
No Chief Justice came to the office having thought more
about its potential than Taft. Although he served less
than a decade, Taft's stamp upon the office was such that
each of his successors has to an important degree had
to fit into expectations which he created.
Few who have ever served or even aspired to be Chief Justice
were better qualified for the position than William Howard
Taft. Taft had been a judge on both the state and the
federal bench. In his thirties he had served on the Superior
Court of Ohio (1887-90). Later, from 1892 to 1900, Taft
was a member of one of the strongest courts in American
history, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which
at one time was composed of three future Justices: Taft,
William Rufus Day and Horace Lurton. Taft wrote two hundred
opinions in eight years on the Sixth Circuit, dissenting
only once (and filing four separate opinions). He was
nationally recognized for his powerful opinions interpreting
the then new Sherman Anti-trust Act, and was viewed as
an anti-labor jurist.
While by no means an important legal scholar like Holmes,
Thayer or Pound, Taft had taught law—as Dean and
Professor at the University of Cincinnati Law School (1896-1900)
and at the Yale Law School (1913-21)
He was the author of a number of books, among them Our
Chief Chief Magistrate and His Powers[2] and The Antitrust
Act and the Supreme Court.[3]
Schooled as well in world affairs, Taft's career as an
executive had been important, as first civil Governor
of the Philippines (1901-04), Secretary of War (1904-09),
and twenty-sixth President of the United States (1909-13).
He was a great success as Secretary of War— the
most influential advisor of—and heir apparent to—Theodore
Roosevelt. But Taft's presidency was notably less successful.
He viewed the powers of that office far more restrictively
than his predecessor,-"waffled" on many issues,
and squandered his popularity.[4] Taft's own opinion of
his administration was unenthusiastic:
. . . a very humdrum, uninteresting administration, and
it does not attract the attention or enthusiasm of anybody.[5]
Naturally, such self-deprecation ought to be viewed in
light of Theodore Roosevelt's flamboyant presidency Taft
added, in words that might as well have been applicable
in large measure to the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower:
. . . I have strengthened the Supreme Bench, have given
them a good deal of new . . . legislation, have kept the
peace, and on the whole have enabled people to pursue
their various occupations without interruptions.[6]
The passage of time and further public service during
and after World War I as co-Chairman of the National War
Labor Board (1918-19) and as a strong supporter of ratification
of the Versailles Peace Treaty, transformed the unpopular
President of 1912 into a well-thought of "elder statesman.
Taft had aspired to a seat on the Supreme Court throughout
his distinguished career. Briefly considered for the High
Court as early as 1889, Taft accepted the position of
Solicitor-General (1890-92), viewing it as a "stepping-stone."
Twice, however, he refused Theodore Roosevelt's tender
of appointment to the Supreme Court—to the seats
vacated by Justices Shiras (1902) and Brown (1906). His
wife's ambitions for a Taft presidency and Taft's commitment
to duties in the Philippines and the War Department dictated
decisions made with regret. Had Chief Justice Fuller retired
or died, Taft would probably have chosen the Chief Justice-ship
over the Presidency He had said, "If the Chief Justice
would only retire how simple everything would become."[7]
Taft's ambition was hardly a closely guarded secret, and
Roosevelt was not above manufacturing rumors of Fuller's
retirement; the old Chief Justice, however, was "not
to be paragraphed" out of his place by news stories.[8]
Mrs. Fuller reportedly sent word to the Philippines, "You
tell Willie Taft not to be in too much of a hurry to get
into my husband's shoes.”[9]
As President, Taft made six appointments to the high bench
with great care, blending concern for the right jurisprudential
outlook with institutional requirements—legal competence,
experience, vigor, integrity, and the ability to work with
others.[10] Judging Taft's appointments by his own criteria,
they failed him in only one important way—longevity
Of the six, only one—Willis Van Devanter —would
serve more than ten years.*
Taft's concern about courts went far beyond his own ambitions
and his belief that the courts would protect private property
From at least the time of his first article, published in
1884, Taft cared passionately about the administration of
justice—the structure and management of courts, their
staffing and procedures.[11] As senior judge of the Sixth
Circuit, he had "demonstrated an abiding interest in
centralized administration of that court," and had
"assumed personal responsibility for those cases which
had been pending before the Court for long periods of time."[12]
As President, Taft was "to a unique degree" interested
in the effective working of the judicial machinery and conversant
with the details of judicial administration.”[13]
In his first address on the State of the Union, Taft argued
that:
* * * * *
*Charles Evans Hughes served five years as a Taft appointee
prior to his resignation in 1916. Succeeding Taft as Chief
Justice, Hughes would serve another eleven years.
* * * * *
. . . a change in judicial procedure with a view to reducing
its expense to private litigants in civil cases and facilitating
the dispatch of business and final decisions in both civil
and criminal cases, constitutes the greatest need in our
American institutions.[14]
As President, Taft bitterly fought the trend in the
states and territories towards recall of judges; he "set
a fire" under the Supreme Court "to modernize
the federal rules of equity,"[15] and vigorously supported
the union of law and equity.
After Taft left the White House, he continued his crusade
for judicial reform in speeches and law review articles
as Kent Professor of Law at Yale (1913-21), president of
the American Bar Association (1913), and president of the
American Academy of Jurisprudence (1914). During this period,
the best known advocate of judicial reform in the United
States continued to yearn to be Chief Justice. Taft was
sixty-three years old in 1920, and the fulfullment of his
ambitions depended upon the victory of Warren G. Harding
that year, and the departure from office of the man he had
appointed, Edward Douglass White.
Personal disappointment had been evident in 1910 as Taft
had set about filling the first vacancy in the Office of
Chief Justice since 1888:
It seems strange that the one place in the government which
I would have liked to fill myself I am forced to give to
another.[16]
Taft bypassed the vigorous forty-eight year old Charles
Evans Hughes, whom he had once indicated he might appoint,
to choose White, a sixty-five year old Democrat; a Roman
Catholic who had fought in the Confederate army, White was
the first Associate Justice ever to be directly promoted
to the Office of Chief Justice. It is difficult to measure
the degree to which Taft's ambitions to be Chief Justice
may have weighed in the selection of White. There were good
reasons for choosing White. His jurisprudential views were
congenial, and with a major transformation occurring in
the membership of the Court,* it made sense to choose someone
who was familiar with its work and traditions. Nor did White
appear to be too old nor too unhealthy to be able to do
hard, routine work. White could handle the procedural and
jurisdictional questions which were often the lot of the
"Chief." White was popular with his colleagues,
and it appeared that his appointment would be well-regarded
by at least three constituencies important to Taft —
Southerners, Roman Catholics, and Theodore Roosevelt.
* * * * * *
*Taft made six appointments in four years.
* * * * * *
On the other hand, the selection of White seems a strange
choice for a President so sensitive to the need for major
changes in the operations of the Supreme Court and management
of federal judiciary "A very dear man,"[17] White
was neither a manager nor a reformer. He proved ineffective
in presiding over the conference of the Court, permitting
rambling debate and generating unnecessary controversy He
was not willing to take the lead in fighting for changes
in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court that would protect
it from being overwhelmed by trivial cases. Although he
sanctioned Justice Willis Van Devanter 's drafting what
later became the Act of January 28, 1915 which slightly
expanded certiorari jurisdiction,[18] White "particularly
requested that it be turned over to a legislator who would
make it his own and in no way connect the Court or any member
of the Court with it."[19] The Chief Justice would
not appoint a committee of Justices having anything to do
with legislation; he was irked by the efforts of Justices
Day, McReynolds and Van Devanter who drafted the Act of
September 6, 1916, which again slightly expanded certiorari
jurisdiction. The legislation was introduced and passed
by the Congress when the Court was in recess; White "never
became reconciled to that act."[20]
White preferred to deal with the caseload problem facing
the Court by modification of methods which had been used
in the Waite and Fuller years: decisions per curium, and
the use of jurisdictional and procedural grounds to avoid
reaching the merits of many cases. There was one innovation,
the summary docket, but with the rapid growth of caseload
during and after World War I, the old methods were not good
enough. White would not fight for more law clerks nor for
a significant improvement in the Court's working space.
What Holmes had written of Fuller in 1908 remained true
at the end of White's tenure:
The Chief twigs things as well as another, but you don't
get him to change what has been, one jot.[21]
Nor would White take the lead in supporting major
changes affecting the lower federal courts. He would not
move in the direction which Taft and others were urging
towards greater centralization with the Chief Justice given
the responsibility to assign judges to overloaded districts.
Indeed, White restrictively interpreted the one law granting
the Chief Justice assignment power—the Act of October
13, 1913. Although he served with Lurton and Van Devanter
on the committee appointed by President Taft in 1911 to
revise the Federal Rules of Equity, White would not support
legislation to delegate rule-making powers in civil cases
to the Supreme Court. As Chief Justice, White strictly curtailed
his public apearances. He addressed the American Bar Association
three times during his tenure, but did not choose to use
that podium to preach sermons of reform. *
Perhaps a younger and healthier White would have responded
more vigorously to the demands of the caseload which occurred
during the end of his tenure, but then he was ailing. Even
in the more effective early years, however, White had preferred
the status quo. The last "Nineteenth Century Chief
Justice," White viewed the office largely the way Taney,
Waite and Fuller had. ** For White, the job of the Chief
Justice was to be head of the Supreme Court: to spare the
Associate Justices from dealing with matters that were primarily
administrative motions and other procedural problems to
be handled with the Clerk; to supervise the Court's other
officers; to apportion the assignment of opinions fairly;
and all the while, to take responsibility for the same duties
of judging as the Associate Justices. Thus, the traditional
view of the job of Chief Justice to which White adhered
was that the Chief Justice was primarily responsible for
maintaining a good working atmosphere within the Supreme
Court,
* * * * *
*On one occasion he introduced the Lord Chancellor;
on another, he responded to a toast. White did speak once
on the public duties of American lawyers.
**Chase's interests clearly transcended the running of the
Supreme Court and riding circuit, but they were primarily
connected with his continuing quest for the Presidency while
turning out more than one-ninth of its opinions.
* * * * *
No one would deny that this was—and is—a difficult
enough job to perform. But the growing centralization of
American government led to increased demands upon the federal
judiciary The courts would not be able to function effectively
without someone taking the lead in pressing for changes
in structure, management, and staffing. William Howard Taft
saw this, and knew that the only person who could be successful
would be the Chief Justice. Thus, Taft became the first
"modern" Chief Justice, looking outside of the
Supreme Court for a substantial part of his duties. His
way of looking at the office, as well as the administrative
mechanisms he established, greatly influenced the manner
in which his successors would view their roles.
The Appointment of Taft as Chief Justice
Seventy-five years old and ailing, with poor eyesight and
poor hearing, Chief Justice White lived through Woodrow
Wilson's Presidency, keeping conscientiously at his job.
Although there were rumors that he was keeping the seat
warm for Taft, White gave no indication that he would retire
after Harding became President on the fourth of March, 1921.
Taft had been a friend and political ally of Harding, having
contributed to his unsuccessful race for Governor of Ohio
in 1910, and having asked Harding to put his name in nomination
in 1912. Soon after the election, Harding indicated to Taft
that he wished to appoint him to the Supreme Court. When
Taft told Harding that he could serve on the Court only
as Chief Justice because he had appointed three of the then
sitting Justices — White, Van Devanter, and Pitney,
and had publicly opposed the confirmation of two others
— Brandeis and Clarke, Harding remained silent. There
were several potential roadblocks to the realization of
Taft's ambition. White would have to leave office soon,
as Taft was already sixty-three years old. Secondly, Charles
Evans Hughes, Harding's Secretary of State, was a potential
rival. Finally, Harding had promised the first available
seat on the Supreme Court to his friend and former colleague,
Senator George Sutherland of Utah. Taft became so impatient
that soon after Harding took office, he paid personal visits
to both White and White's physician, to ascertain the state
of White's health.
White died on May 19, 1921. Spurred by Attorney General
Harry Daugherty, who felt that he could work well with Taft
on matters of federal judicial administration, Harding appointed
Taft on June 30th. He was confirmed on the same day he was
appointed with but four dissenting votes. Taft took the
oath of office on July 11th and immediately went to work.
Chief Justice Taft
William Howard Taft brought to the Office of Chief Justice
the prestige of the presidency; a lifetime of experience
and special interest in courts and politics; an intricate
network of friends throughout the three branches of the
national government, among the bar, and in the press; a
winning personality; and, a carefully considered view of
what the job of the Chief Justice should be. Taft believed
that within the Supreme Court the Chief Justice must "promote
teamwork" to give the product of the institution "weight
and solidarity."[22] To that end, he brought unusual
administrative skills and an attractive personality It was,
however, in his view of the appropriate responsibilities
of the Chief Justice outside of the Supreme Court that Taft
departed audaciously from his predecessors. If Taft's view
of the constitutional powers of the President had been narrow,
his views of the prerogatives, duties and responsibilities
of the Chief Justice were "almost majestic."[23]
Accepting responsibility for acting as a visible spokesman
for change, Taft brought the "executive principle"
to the federal courts, fighting for a program of reform
with an extraordinary array of tactics and unflagging energy.
The Taft Program
Taft became Chief Justice at one of those times during which
congestion and delay in the federal court system had become
especially intolerable.[24] The jurisdiction of the federal
courts had grown rapidly within a short period of years,
largely as a result of new federal laws regulating the economy
wartime measures, and a host of new federal penal offenses.
Between 1918 and 1921, civil cases with the United States
as a party filed in the federal courts increased from 2,877
to 9,727. Other civil cases filed increased from 13,789
to 22,453. Criminal cases increased from 35,096* to 54,487.[25]
There was no increase in the number of federal judgeships
during the period. In 1922, Albert Cummings, United States
Senator from Iowa, stated that "in many parts of the
United States it is utterly impossible to secure the trial
of a civil suit within one year or two years."[26]
* * * * * *
*In 1917 there were only 19,828 criminal cases filed.
* * * * * *
When Taft became Chief Justice, the federal court system
had no system-wide direction. Life-tenured judges went unsupervised
and unassisted. Local judges had complete power over patronage
and were accountable only through impeachment. Felix Frankfurter
and James M. Landis described the situation this way:
Each judge was left to himself, guided in the administration
of his business by his conscience and his temperament.[27]
The traditional remedies for increased workload had been
the creation of new federal courts, more judgeships, or
curtailment of jurisdiction. Taft supported the creation
of new judgeships and curtailing the obligatory jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, but he also placed an emphasis upon
better management, accountability of District Judges for
their docket, and modernized rules of procedure. Concerned
about delays, high court fees, unnecessarily complex procedures,
abuses in the appointment of receivers in bankruptcy, and
misconduct in the offices of clerks of court, Taft believed
that someone—or some institution — had to be
responsible for the overall business of the federal courts;
judicial independence did not mean freedom from oversight
of the management of court business.
The Executive Principle
Taft first sought a new institution—a multi-judge
agency—which would provide "machinery of a quasi-executive
character" to mass the judicial force to attack congestion,
wherever it might be. He sought to introduce into the judicial
system "an executive principle to secure effective
team work."[28] To this end he proposed annual meetings
of the Chief Justice and the Senior Circuit Judges of the
then nine circuits, to join with the Attorney General in
considering reports on the business in each district from
the district judges and clerks. The conference would make
"a yearly plan for the massing of the new and old judicial
force of the United States in those districts all over the
country where the arrears" were "threatening to
interfere with the usefulness of courts."[29]
The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, composed of the
Chief Justice and nine Circuit Senior Judges, was established
by the Act of September 14, 1922, to meet annually upon
the summons of the Chief Justice. The Conference was to
make a comprehensive survey of the condition of the business
in the courts, prepare plans for the assignment of judges,
and submit suggestions to the courts in the interest of
uniformity and expedition of business.[30] Taft presided
over the Conference, voted as a member, and appointed its
committees, all the while serving as its staff.
Through the creation of what in time became the Judicial
Conference of the United States, leadership in federal judicial
administration was given to the Chief Justice and the senior
circuit judges. In the early years the Conference not only
collected statistics, but as a result of Taft's prodding,
discussed in specifics the quantity and quality of justice
in the trial courts in each district, beginning to serve
as a clearing house for recommendations to the Congress.
The power to act directly upon individual judges was not
clearly defined by the legislation creating the Conference.
The Conference was hardly a centralized executive, nor has
it ever truly become one. There would not be direct control
by command; rather there was coordination through persuasion.[31]
The Conference was but a "first step towards a more
integrated administrative system,"[32] providing not
management, but important oversight and coordination.
Judgeships
Fears of centralization, of the dimunition of judicial independence,
and of the Chief Justice amassing too much power, led to
the defeat of the second plank in Taft's platform: the creation
of eighteen new judgeships, two to a circuit, who would
not be permanently assigned to any specific district, but
rather, assignable by the Senior Circuit Judge to any district
within his circuit, and by the Chief Justice to any district
outside the home circuit. In 1921, the Chief Justice of
the United States could only assign judges with light caseloads
to the Second Circuit, and then only with the consent of
the individual District Judge. * Taft's proposal would have
provided the federal courts, guided by the Conference, with
a judicial force to grapple with the arrears and end them.[33]
Taft proposed that the judgeships be "temporary,"
expiring when the first appointee left the bench unless
Congress provided otherwise; his proposal also left the
judges-at-large without the power to make patronage appointments.
Taft hoped that the at-large judgeships would head off attempts
to create new judgeships for political reasons, and that
the positions might be filled by more able judges than usual,
for the judges would be chosen from a pool that was circuit-wide
rather than district-wide.[34]
In the end, Taft received half-a-loaf. Twenty-four new judgeships
were created—more judges than he wanted, and the largest
increase since the First Judiciary Act—but they were
placed within specific districts, with the assignment power
shared by the Chief Justice and the Senior Circuit Judges
of the "giving" and "receiving" circuits.
Thus, Taft had less formal assignment authority with regard
to the circuits than his predecessor had enjoyed with respect
to the Second Circuit.[35] What assignment powers Taft did
have, he would be especially careful not to over-exercise.[36]
* * * * * *
*However, the Chief Justice could assign the judges of the
Commerce Court, which had been abolished, to any circuit.
* * * * * *
Rule-Making Power
The third part of Chief Justice Taft's program was the delegation
by Congress to the courts of rule-making powers enabling
the adoption of a single code of federal practice for civil
cases. As early as 1908, Taft had been critical of the Conformity
Act of 1872, which required federal courts to follow in
civil cases the procedures of the state in which the federal
court was meeting. As a result, federal procedures in civil
cases varied from state to state, and federal courts could
do nothing to modify those procedures which were archaic
and complex.
For more than a century the Supreme Court had exercised
the power to lay down national rules of equity, admiralty
and bankruptcy for the federal courts. As President, Taft
had successfully pressed for revisions of the Federal rules
of Equity, a revision which permitted parties to bring controversies
before the courts in intelligible, factual form, omitting
ritualistic and obscure language - As Chief Justice, Taft
favored the unification of law and equity in one national
code of procedure:
All that is needed is to vest the same power in the Supreme
Court with reference to the rules at common law and then
to give that court the power to blend them into a code,
which shall make the procedure the same in all and as simple
as possible.[37]
Taft envisioned a "system so simple that it needs
no special knowledge to master it," a system which
would be "a model for all other courts."[38]
Congress would not delegate rule-making powers in civil
cases to the Supreme Court in Taft's lifetime. Even among
his colleagues, Taft was unable to convince Holmes, Brandeis
and McReynolds. But by giving visibility and sustenance
to the two-decade long struggle of the American Bar Association
Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure,
led by Thomas W. Shelton, Taft sowed the seeds which would
be successfully reaped a few years later by Homer Cummings,
William D. Mitchell, Charles E. Clark, and Chief Justice
Charles Evans Hughes.[39] The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were one of the great reforms in the American judicial process
in the Twentieth Century.[40] The rule-making process itself
and the substance of the Federal Rules were widely emulated
by state courts.*
* * * * *
*In recent years both the process and the rules themselves
have been called into question. See, e.g., Jeffrey B - Morris,
"The Changing Federal Courts," in (ed.) Richard
M. Pious, "The Power to Govern," 34 Proc. Acad.
Pot. Sci. No. 290,97-99(1981).
* * * * * *
Discretionary Jurisdiction for the Court
The fourth part of Taft's program was providing relief
for an overburdened Supreme Court through substantial
restriction of the unqualified right to appeal from courts
below. The Evarts Act of March 3, 1891, which created
the Courts of Appeals, substantially increased federal
appellate capacity and provided discretionary jurisdiction
for the Supreme Court in a limited class of cases.[41]
That jurisdiction, by way of the writ of certiorari, had
been slighty expanded in 1915 and 1916. Further relief
proved necessary as growing caseloads eradicated the benefits
of the 1891 Act. In 1910, for example, the Court disposed
of 509 cases; by 1916, there were 647 filed and the Court
disposed of just ten fewer. Justice John Hessin Clarke
complained of the "amount of grinding, uninteresting,
bone labor," and added that "much more than
one-half of the cases are of no considerable importance."[42]
Taft saw as a goal that:
. . . there must be some method adopted by which the cases
brought before that Court shall be reduced in number, and
yet the Court may retain full jurisdiction to pronounce
the last word on every important issue under the Constitution
and Statutes of the United States on all important questions
of general law with respect to which there is a lack of
uniformity in the intermediate appellate Federal courts
of appeal.[43]
Taft proposed to replace much of the Supreme Court's obligatory
jurisdiction with an expanded use of the writ of certiorari.
Taft also hoped that at the same time the Court's discretionary
jurisdiction was broadened, the laws governing the Supreme
Court would be recodified "to enable any lawyer, judge,
or layman, to look to one statute and be sure that it contains
all there is on the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court."[44]
Taft was the central force behind the enactment of enlarged
certiorari jurisdiction. Senator Albert B. Cummings of Iowa
purportedly requested Taft to appoint a committee of Justices
to draft a measure for relief of the Court. Taft appointed
Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland,* and sat with the
committee himself. The measure drafted by the Justices was
eventually approved by the entire court, Taft having persuaded
Justice Brandeis not to
* * * * *
* Sutherland replaced Day on the latter's retirement.
* * * * * *
make his opposition public.[45] Taft arranged the testimony
of Justice Van Devanter before the Congress, "set in
motion the powerful machinery and organization of the American
Bar Association,"[46] and drafted the language used
by the President to support the bill.[47] The Judge's Bill
was introduced on March 30, 1922, and became law on February
13, 1925 — a very short time for enactment of such
a major reform in judicial administration.
Once again, Taft had to settle for half-a-loaf—recodification
of the laws governing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
into one statute was not accomplished—but, what a
half loaf it was! By 1933 Felix Frankfurter and Henry M.
Hart, Jr. could report that:
. . . the Court is hearing and disposing of all litigation
brought before it without delay and without sacrifice of
any of the guarantees of ample argument and due deliberation
which the effective exercise of its functions demands. In
so doing, it sets a standard for state courts of last resort
throughout the country.[48]
Taft's medicine put the disease into remission for
two generations. Stating that the Chief Justice's very active
part in shepherding the Act of 1925 "entitles him to
a high place among judicial statesmen," Justice William
Rehnquist concludes:
Chief Justice Taft foresaw the need for this grant of discretionary
jurisdiction before it became indispensable, It is due to
his foresight and to his willingness to perform tasks outside
of the normal business that the Supreme Court today is as
currently abreast of its docket as it is.[49]
Tactics
As President, William Howard Taft appeared to be a bumbling,
indecisive amateur who was ill at ease in politics and cautious
in the exercise of the powers of his office. As Chief Justice,
Taft was deft and professional, effective in the game of
politics, bold in assertion of the prerogatives of the office.
Thoroughly knowledgable about judicial administration, Taft
possessed an intricate network of contacts; coming to office
with a program, he filled the traditional vacuum in judicial
administration, a vacuum compounded by a compliant President
and an Attorney General who knew little about the needs
of the courts.[50]
Taft moved rapidly once he took office. Almost immediately,
he met with the Attorney General's five-person committee
on court reform chaired by Judge John E. S later of the
Sixth Circuit, Taft urged the committee to recommend that
administrative power for the court system be placed with
the Chief Justice and Senior Circuit judges in collaboration
with the Attorney General. Asked by Daugherty to comment
on the work of the committee and to draft legislation
implementing his vision of a council of judges, Taft doubled
the number of District Judges recommended by the committee,
and inserted language requiring annual reports by each
District Judge on the business of his court,.[51]
Throughout his tenure, Taft was willing to place the prestige
of his office on the line for his program. He was not troubled
by the separation of powers, If anything, he considered
that the separation of powers warranted his activities,
making it his duty to propose and press reforms.[52] Taft
testified formally before Congressional committees and subcommittees
a number of times. He wrote to Congressmen and buttonholed
them in the Capitol. He called upon his colleagues for assistance:
Van Devanter, McReynolds and Sutherland testified on the
Judges' Bill; Holmes and Brandeis joined Taft in testifying
on behalf of the acquisition of a library for the federal
courthouse in Boston.[53] As Chief Justice, Taft worked
well with the Congress, employing his charm and prestige;
he knew when to take soundings, when to move, when to place
himself on the line, and equally important, when to pull
back and let others carry on.
Taft forged an extraordinary partnership with the executive
branch during his tenure, especially in the first few years,
wielding immense influence upon Daugherty and Harding. His
relations were cordial with Coolidge and Attorney General
Harlan Fiske Stone, but were less effectual with Attorneys
General Charles B. Warren and John G. Sargent. He was not
close to President Hoover, but was successful in lobbying
for the appointment of William Mitchell to head the Department
of Justice.[54] Taft, however, went well beyond close collaboration
with Attorneys General. The Justice Department was responsible
at the time for many of the administrative details connected
with the running of the federal courts; prior to making
requests for appropriations, Taft met personally with members
of the Department's budget section and with the Director
of the Bureau of the Budget.[55]
Not until Warren E. Burger would a Chief Justice forge as
effective a partnership with the organized bar as Taft.
In 1923 the Chief Justice wrote:
There is no reason why the bar should not exert a tremendous
influence through the country. Its organization is necessary
to bring about such a result. I want, so far as I can, to
organize the Bench and Bar into a united group in this country
dedicated to the cause of the improvement in judicial procedure
and in the defense of the constitutional provisions for
the maintaining, through the judiciary, of the guarantees
of the Constitution. [56]
Elihu Root, a leader of the bar and an old friend
from his years in the Cabinet, wrote Taft in 1922, stating
that he was "the first Chief Justice to fully appreciate
the dynamics of the bar as an organization."[57] Taft
attended meetings of the ABA, stating that:
I deem this one of the most important extracurriculum things
that I have to do as Chief Justice."[58]
H e frequently used the podiums of local bar associations,
and as the "godfather" of the American Law Institute,
began in 1927 the tradition of an address to that body by
the Chief Justice.[59] Solicitous and accessible to these
organizations, Taft reaped their support for his measures
and insured their opposition to measures which he opposed.
In contrast, the Judicial Conference offered a pulpit for
a different message. Peter Fish has written:
The Chief Justice commanded the Conference. For Taft, it
was command with a purpose, for the two to five-day sessions
afforded him a means of giving "unity to the federal
judicial force." The social as well as the business
aspects of the meetings were intended to inculcate a national
perspective among the ranking federal judges. To this end,
the Chief Justice arranged for Conference members to visit
the White House and meet the President, and gave them a
luncheon at the Metropolitan Club.[60]
Ill at ease with the press and with critics as President,
Taft collaborated with both as Chief Justice. As Chairman
of the Conference, he became its public relations director.[61]
He encouraged interviews with newspapers and magazines.[62]
As for critics, Professor Felix Frankfurter provides a typical
example. Frankfurter wired Taft in 1926 urging appointment
of a Conference committee on statistics. Taft did what Frankfurter
asked, appointing as the committee chairman Charles M. Hough,
a jurist whom both men greatly respected.[63]
Taft's political abilities and alliances not only helped
him win approval for the greater part of the four-part program
already discussed but also resulted in victories against
the Caraway bill which would have prevented federal judges
from commenting upon the testimony of witnesses, and the
Norris bill which would have eliminated the diversity jurisdiction
of the federal courts.
No Chief Justice before or after Taft has had such an influence
upon the appointment of judges. He was influential because
he was a former President and party leader, but also because
he was knowledgeable, concerned, and tenacious. Even before
he became Chief Justice, Taft had written Attorney General
Daugherty:
If you don't mind it, my interests in the Federal Judiciary,
where I know something of the situation, makes me anxious
to give you benefit of what I have learned from considerable
experience. lam not butting in, but lam only testifying,
without any personal slant and only with a view of helping
if I can.[64]
Daugherty did not mind it, welcoming the overture:
"I want you at all times to feel free to make suggestions."[65]
This proved to be more than a politician's tact.
Taft sought the advice of lawyers, federal judges, politicians
journalists, family and friends about possible nominees
to the bench.[66] He located and advanced candidates, gathering
a great deal of information with which he bombarded Attorneys
General and Presidents in writing and in person. He would
go to extraordinary lengths to keep from the bench judges
he felt ill equipped, pleading with judges not to retire
or to delay their retirements; he even pursued Coolidge
onto the Harding funeral train in order to neutralize the
efforts of a particular 5enator.[67] Taft's standards—legal
competence, sound views, "team players" and honesty—were
usually high; generally, the bench was the stronger for
his activities. Due in some measure to his involvement,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was transformed
into a great court through the appointments of Thomas Swan,
and Learned and Augustus Hand.[68]
Few statements show as little self-awareness as Taft's homily
of July 30, 1921 that "the Chief Justice goes into
a monastery and confines himself to his judicial work."[69]
Taft was, to be sure, personally honest, but he hardly was
"more circumspect than Caesar's wife."[70] Taft
altered what had become the accepted view of how a Chief
Justice should behave. Reacting to the excesses of Salmon
P. Chase, Morrison Waite stayed out of activities other
than judicial business. Melville Weston Fuller was the first
Chief Justice to absent himself from a heavy Washington
social schedule. As Chief Justice, Edward Douglass White
avoided public speeches and hung back from pushing for judicial
reforms. Taft, however, broke new ground. He placed the
Office of Chief Justice in the front lines of the fight
for reform, and became an outspoken advocate for important
issues.
Certain aspects of this new expanded role for the Chief
Justice did raise questions. For example should the nation's
highest legal officer advise the President about pardons,
or serve as emissary to convince an Attorney General besmirched
by convincing allegations of corruption to resign?[71] The
special interest of Chief Justices from the time of Morrison
Waite in the legal resolution of conflicts between nations
might explain Taft's interest in the plank of the Republican
party platform devoted to the World Court. If Taft engaged
in activities which might be considered inappropriate for
a Chief Justice, such behavior was largely harmless. He
urged Presidents to remain steadfast in pursuing policies
to which they were already committed. His irrepressible
fraternization with old friends, some of whom continued
to argue before the High Court, may have dismayed the more
austere Charles Evans Hughes, but didn't place the Court
in disrepute.
Some of Taft's activities, however, should not belong to
the "job description" of a Chief Justice. Taft
advised Presidents on the substance of legislation unrelated
to the courts. He encouraged friends to lobby to sustain
presidential vetoes. He wrote to editors to persuade them
to influence the legislative process. He took soundings
of Republicans in Rhode Island on Coolidge's prospects for
the presidential nomination of a incumbent senator. What
is perhaps nation of a incumbent Senator. What is perhaps
most remarkable is how little criticism Taft received for
these activities.
Massing the Court
No Chief Justice can be said to have exercised true intellectual
domination over the work of the Supreme Court since Marshall,
if indeed Marshall did so. Some like Taney exercised a good
deal of influence upon the jurisprudence of the era. Fuller
and Hughes managed the conference of the court well, assigned
opinions deftly, and produced a congenial working atmosphere
that maximized the productivity of their colleagues. Waite
and Hughes' administrative talents spared their colleagues
a good deal of time in dealing with judicial flotsam and
jetsam.
Taft came to office having given considerable thought as
to how he might exercise influence upon the Court's jurisprudence
and working conditions. He considered it to be the duty
of the Chief Justice to "mass" the Court in order
to give "weight and solidarity" to its opinions.
Marshalling the Court to achieve the greatest possible consensus
consistent with precedent was clearly Taft's goal:
The Chief Justice is the head of the Court, and while his
vote counts but one in the nine, he is, if he be a man of
strong and persuasive personality, abiding convictions,
recognized learning and statesman-like foresight, expected
to promote teamwork by the Court, so as to give it weight
and solidarity to its opinions. [A great Chief Justice is]
winning in his way, strong in his responsibility for the
Court, earnest in his desire to avoid divisions, and highly
skilled in reconciling difficulties in the minds of his
brethren.[72]
In a now classic article on the role of the Chief Justice,
David J. Danelski argues that two leaders often emerge in
a small group: a task leader— someone able to present
views with force and clarity, and the person to whom colleagues
turn when perplexing questions arise; and, a social leader
— someone who provides "the warmth and friendliness
which make interpersonal relations pleasant or even possible."
The social leader raises the self-esteem of the members
of the group, accepts suggestions readily, and is quick
to relieve tensions with a laugh or friendly joke.[73] According
to Danelski, Taft was just that kind of social-oriented
leader.
Taft was an effective head of the Supreme Court. He managed
its business well. He usually massed a majority for his
jurisprudential views through intellectual persuasion, warmth
and charm, and to some extent, through his unique influence
upon the process of selection of Justices. In his early
years as Chief Justice he was especially effective in discouraging
dissent. Measuring Taft's impact in terms of institutional
cohesion, "job satisfaction" of his colleagues,
and to a slightly lesser extent, productivity, Taft was
one of the most satisfactory Chief Justices of this century.[74]
It is worth pausing to examine Taft's effectiveness as chairman
of the committee of nine, by looking at him through the
eyes of his great colleague, Oliver Wendell Holmes, whose
admiration and fondness for Taft grew over the years. Holmes
was unenthusiastic at the prospect of Taft as Chief Justice.
A few days after Chief Justice White's death, Holmes wrote
to Harold Laski:
Now people speculate as to who will take White's place.
Taft is much mentioned. I would rather have Hughes, but
I think he doesn't want it. Hughes is very hard working.
Taft is said to be indolent. He has been out of judicial
place for 20 years or so—and though he did well as
a Circuit Judge I never saw anything that struck me as more
than first rate second rate. I have heard it said and denied
that he is hard to get along with if you don't agree with
him.[75]
On the day Taft took the oath of office, Holmes wrote
to Sir Frederic Pollack:
I am looking forward with curiosity to the new Chief Justice.
He marked a fundamental difference in our way of thinking
by saying that this office always had been his ambition.
I don't understand ambition for an office.[76]
But, as usual, Homes mind was open, educable by experience.
Early in Taft's first term he wrote to Laski:
Taft, t think will do well as CJ—the executive details,
which, as I have said, are the matters upon which the
CJ most counts as such, will be turned off with less feeling
of friction and more rapidly [than with his predecessor].[77]
Two months later, Holmes wrote the same correspondent:
I continue pleased with the Chief's way of conducting business
through at times a little too long winded which I dare say
he will get over.[78]
Towards the end of Taft's first term, he wrote to Laski:
Taft continues to give me great satisfaction as C. J. Also
he is amiable and comfortable.[79]
A few weeks later, Holmes wrote to Pollock:
We are very happy with the present Chief, as I may have
told you. He is good humored, laughs readily, not quite
rapid enough, but keeping things moving pleasantly His writing
varies; he has done some things that I don't care for but
others that I think touch a pretty high level.[80]
In February 1923 Holmes wrote Pollock that "the meetings
are perhaps pleasanter than I ever have know them—thanks
largely to the C. J. In a letter to his son on May 3, 1925,
Taft himself quoted Holmes as saying that "never before
. . . have we gotten along with so little jangling and dissension."'[82]
On November 13, 1925, Holmes stated that Taft was "the
best appointment that could have been made."[83] Finally,
Homes wrote Laski in 1926 stating that "I think Taft
is all the better Chief Justice for having been President.”[84]
Felix Frankfurter, a great admirer of Holmes but by no means
an unabashed admirer of Taft, said many years afterwards
that Taft was "instinctively genial with great warmth
and a capacity to inspire feelings of comaraderie about
him."[85] Taft was no saint. In private, he demonstrated
sensitivity to opposition from his brethren, and in personal
correspondence, questioned and deprecated the motives of
his antagonists. In public and with his brethren, however,
he kept his tongue, and during the years of his Chief Justiceship
— except near the end — his normally good spirits
prevailed.
Taft attended sincerely to those little human details which
make a man beloved. Gifts and cards of condolence or of
good cheer went to bereaved or sick colleagues. After the
Saturday conference of the Court, he would always drive
Holmes and Brandeis home. After Taft handled the arrangements
for the burial of Mrs. Holmes in Arlington National Cemetery,
the eighty-eight year old skeptic wrote to Laski, no admirer
of Taft, "How can one help loving a man with such a
kind heart?"[86] Despite the ritualistic quality in
letters to and from a retiring Justice, the words used on
Taft's retirement ring with special sincerity and warmth;
tough men, strong men like Holmes, Brandeis and Stone, Sutherland,
Butler and McReynolds, wrote:
We cannot let you leave us without trying to tell you how
dear you have made it... you showed us . . . your golden
heart that has brought you love from every side.[87]
That heart softened for the Court the adversities of the
decade. Van Devanter and Sutherland appear to have broken
down from overwork. McReynolds was an extremely disagreeable
colleague who may have suffered from a tendency to "underword."
Having arranged for special legislation to permit Mahlon
Pitney's retirement without publicizing the extent of his
illness, Taft had also to deal with Justice McKenna, no
longer mentally sound, who after the death of his wife,
clung to the Court as his one reason for life. Authorized
by his brethren to handle the problem as he saw fit, Taft
spoke with Justice McKenna, respected his request for the
assignment of a few more opinions, and orchestrated his
final day on the bench as a loving ritual.[88]
It was a happier time than usual to be a justice during
the Taft era; working conditions within the Supreme Court
greatly improved, not only as a result of Taft's infusion
of vigor after White's last years, and his ready laugh and
good humor, but also because he was an excellent administrator.
When Taft assigned opinions, he spread the "desirable"
cases around taking more than his share of "undesirable"
cases. Furthermore, Taft set the standard for hard work.
In little more than eight full terms, Taft wrote 255 opinions
for the Court. Averaging nearly thirty-two opinions for
the Court per term,[89] Taft achieved the fifth highest
record in productivity of the Court's 102 Justices. * Taft's
eight colleagues averaged a little over twenty opinions
each during the same period.[90] Taft wrote twenty-five
percent more opinions than either Holmes or Brandeis** during
these years—not a bad pace for a man who returned
to judging in his mid-sixties after two decades away, and
who suffered three heart attacks in 1924. In 1928 the Chief
Justice wrote, probably wryly, to his son that he was often
faced with "a cabal in the court to try to influence
me to reduce work."[91]
Much of Taft's success within the Court was due to the fact
that he did not attempt to do all the work himself nor to
take all of the credit. He admitted readily that he could
not have gotten along without Van Devanter. He called the
Justice from Wyoming "my Chancellor" and used
him as legislative draftsman, opinion critic, and advisor
on judgeship nominees. Van Devanter was asked to stand-in
for the Chief Justice regarding activities in judicial administration
while Taft was in England during the summer of 1922.[92]
When it looked as if an appearance by Taft before Congress
on the Judge's Bill might hinder rather than expedite its
passage, Taft stayed out of the limelight; he appointed
a committee comprised of Van Devanter (the best informed
on the mechanics of the legislation), Sutherland (a former
Senator) and McReynolds (a Democrat) to testify in his stead.
When disagreement truly existed within the Court—as
over the delegation or rulemaking power—Taft did not
minimize it nor run roughshod over it." Tactics like
these helped make Brandeis an ally a surprising proportion
of the time, and along with his constant stress upon institutional
norms, helped Taft is his goal of eliminating or at least
minimizing dissent.
There were some times, however, when Taft thought dissent
appropriate: if a Justice felt strongly that the majority
had erred in handling an important principle; or, if a dissent
might truly have practical value. For the most part, however,
Taft believed that "a Justice should be a good member
of the team, silently acquiescing in the views of the majority."[94]
He used the power of example, suppressing more than two
hundred of his dissenting votes while he was on the Court.
Taft also employed the power of opinion assignment, relying
upon his charm and the constant reiteration of the norm
to achieve his goal without generating opposition. Dissent
could hardly be eliminated in the modern Supreme Court,
but it was considerably lessened during the Taft years—
especially in the early part—as men of the calibre
of Holmes and Brandeis accepted Taft's institutional values.[95]
There are many reasons for the Court's productivity during
this period. The happy working atmosphere, the new certiorari
jurisdiction, and Taft's competence in presiding over the
conference certainly contributed to greater productivity
But the Court was also strengthened by the retirements of
Pitney, McKenna and Day, and by the relative youth and legal
competence of the Justices who joined the court during the
1920's. Taft's influence upon the appointment of Justices
during his tenure is unique among Chief Justices, and might
be compared only to the influence of Felix Frankfurter upon
appointments to the Supreme Court. Taft was most influential
in the choice of Pierce Butler to succeed Justice Day That
appointment was engineered by Taft, who presented Butler's
candidacy to Harding, advised Butler on how to secure the
position, mobilized support for Butler from the Catholic
hierarchy, and orchestrated the campaign for confirmation.[96]
With Harding's other two appointments—Sutherland and
Sanford—and Coolidge's appointment of Stone, Taft's
role was less significant, but not altogether unimportant.
Taft appears to have encouraged Harding to go ahead with
his commitment to Sutherland. With a little less enthusiasm,
Taft seems to have encouraged Coolidge to appoint Stone.
With all four vacancies, Taft suggested candidates to the
Attorney General and President, and investigated the backgrounds
of candidates, whether or not he was solicited to do so.
Taft quenched enthusiasm for candidates less likely to be
"safe" and "team players." Safety meant
for Taft, of course, someone who would "enforce the
guarantee that no man shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law."[97] As the Taft of 1922
was considerably more conservative than the Taft of 1910,
this required solid conservatives like Sutherland or John
W. Davis, but not reactionaries as McReynolds then appeared
to Taft. It meant that Taft opposed the elevation
* * * * * *
*Behind Waite, Blatchford, Fuller and Matthews.
**and considerably more than Sutherland, Butler and Sanford,
as well as more than twice as many annually as Van Devanter.
* * * * * *
to the high court of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo and Learned
Hand, admittedly capable, but not safe. Taft fought more
bitterly, though, against the candidacy of Martin Manton,
a man whom the Chief Justice believed to be unscrupulous.
Taft's judgment was correct. Manton would eventually end
up in prison.
Taft was willing to move ahead without listening to the
voices of his colleagues in one area—a new building
for the Supreme Court. Of his unenthusiastic brethren, Taft
would say, not entirely unfairly on this issue, that they
"did not look forward or beyond their own service on
the bench or its needs."[98] Though Taft would probably
have fought for such a building while he was in the White
House, it does not seem to have been part of his original
program when he became Chief Justice. The Court manifestly
had grown out of its twelve rooms inconveniently located
in the Capitol, and Taft was increasingly frustrated in
his bargaining with Congressmen for more desirable space.
Taft finally convinced the House Public Buildings Committee
to include moneys for the purchase of land in a fifty million
dollar public building bill. He was the dominant figure
in the choice of the site and the architect, Cass Gilbert.
The Chief Justice lived just long enough to see Congress
approve Gilbert's plans and appropriate $9,740,000 for construction,
a law signed by Herbert Hoover on December 17, 1929.[99]
Taft-the-Justice
The career of Taft-the-Justice has been overshadowed by
that of Taft-the-Chancellor, and Taft as head-of-the-Supreme
Court. This is not unjust, for Taft did adapt the Court
and the federal court system to their times and for several
generations hence. In contrast, Taft-the-Justice looked
backwards to a jurisprudence which strained the Constitution
by unduly protecting property rights and by making the court
the ultimate judge of the wisdom of state and federal legislation.
Although Taft was a reformer of courts, he was not a social
reformer. It has been argued with considerable justice that
Taft wished to reform the federal judiciary primarily to
strengthen it as a bulwark for the protection of private
property rights; his goal was to enhance federal judicial
power so as to better restrain the excesses likely to occur
in the states.[100] Whatever his motivation, Taft's impact
upon the Supreme court and the lower federal courts was
nevertheless to modernize their administration and enable
them to cope with the needs of a strong central government.
Taft's work as a Justice should not, however, be ignored
completely Although Taft himself contributed to the view
that he was a "legal light weight" through his
appreciation of Van Devanter's contributions in the conference
and in critiquing his own opinions,[101] his judicial work
is stronger than has been recognized. He was productive.
He took on patent cases, ordinarily not an area for weak
legal technicians.[102] His opinions are not in the same
league with those of Holmes and Brandeis, but generally
read no worse than those of his other colleagues. Taft did
not "dominate" his Court, nor did he dominate
his "wing" of the Court, but he helped to lead
the Court in the direction he wished without evoking disrespect
from either Holmes or Brandeis.*
That direction was toward voiding federal—and especially—state
laws regulating the economy, relying primarily upon theories
of substantive due process, liberty of contract, and dual
federalism.'[103] If Taft during the 1920's was more conservative
than he had been as President, Chief Justice Taft's court
was more conservative than the court headed by Chief Justice
White. Sutherland, Butler and Sanford were more conservative
than the three men ** they replaced: Clarke, Day and Pitney.[104]
The pace of nullification of state actions quickened appreciably
during the Taft years. From 1870 to 1921 the Supreme Court
had held thirteen state and five federal laws unconstitutional
in 195 cases invoking the due process clause. From 1921
to 1926 the Court struck down statutes in fifteen of fifty-three
cases.[105] In his judicial career Taft sat on 114 cases
(12.67/year) in which legislative acts of states were voided,
all but a handful involving property rights.[106]
A recent scholar has argued that due to the Taft Court,
the Courts of the Fuller and White eras have appeared more
conservative than they really were:
Perhaps more than anything else this tendency of the Court
of the 1920s to exploit distinctions and language found
in earlier opinions, which the High Bench of the preceding
generation had chosen wisely to ignore, and to use as precedents
decisions that were bitterly attacked at the time of their
issuance gave credence to the contention that the period
from the depression of the 1890s to that of the 1930s could
be interpreted meaningfully as a whole.[107]
A brief survey of some of Taft's major opinions will suggest
how he fitted in with the prevailing jurisprudence of
his era. In Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations,[108]
Taft wrote for a unanimous court, striking down on due
process grounds a Kansas law which required compulsory
arbitration of wage disputes. Felix Frankfurter commented:
Thus fails another social experiment not because it has
been tried and found wanting, but because it has been tried
and found unconstitutional.[109]
Taft carried the entire Court—except for Justice Clarke
— in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.[110] The case
not unrealistically held that Congress was using its taxing
power to penalize a company for doing business with child
labor rather than to raise revenue for the federal government.
In an attempt to circumvent the Court's holding in Hammer
v. Dagenhart[111] that child labor could not be regulated
under the Commerce Clause, Congress had again intruded unconstitutionally
upon reserved state powers.
Taft was generally unsympathetic to the rights of labor.
Writing for court divided 5-4 in Truax v. Corrigan.[112]
Taft held unconstitutional on due process grounds an Arizona
law which had limited the use of injunctions in labor cases.
Professor Frankfurter, writing anonymously in the New Republic,
spoke of the "jejune logomarchy of his judicial process,"
adding:
at the Chief Justice of the United States pays to the facts
of industrial life, he might as well have written this opinion
as Chief Justice of the Fiji Islands.[113]
In American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Council, Taft's
opinion for the Court circumvented the Clayton's Act general
ban on injunctions in industrial disputes."[114] In
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.,[115] Taft's opinion
for the Court held that a trade union was suable and liable
for damages under the Sherman Act.
Yet, there is another side. Felix Frankfurter himself was
of the viewpoint that the Coronado case was not so adverse
to the rights of labor.[116] And at various times, Taft
departed from the conservative wing of the Court demonstrating
respect for recent precedents upholding statutes regulating
the economy His opinion in Stafford v. Wallace is a milestone
upholding Congressional power under the Commerce Clause.
Stafford involved the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921
which regulated the business of meat packers. Taft, not
unreasonably concluded that the Chicago Stockyards were
not a final destination, but "a throat through which
the current flows."[117] In words which sounded as
if they came from the pen of Holmes, Taft wrote:
This court will certainly not substitute its judgment
for that of Congress in such a matter unless the relation
of the subject to interstate commerce and its effect upon
it are clearly nonexistent.[118]
Even if the "Supreme Court under Taft had reached the
zenith of reaction,"[119] Taft was not always on the
side of the reactionaries, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
Taft joined Holmes in dissent (Brandeis not participating)
from a decision striking down a law of the District of Columbia
setting minimum wages for women. In his Adkins dissent,
Taft again sounded like Holmes or Brandeis:
But it is not the function of this Court to hold Congressional
acts invalid simply because they are passed to carry out
economic views which the Court believes to be unwise or
unsound.[120]
The former President was especially interested in opinions
interpreting Article II of the Constitution. The opinion
upon which he lavished the most love of any in his eight
terms was Myers v. United States,[121] sanctioning virtually
unlimited Presidential power to remove any executive officer.
Holmes, Brandeis and McReynolds dissented. Myers would be
considerably limited within a decade.[122]
During Taft's tenure, the Supreme Court began the process
of incorporating the First Amendment via the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect individuals from actions of the states,[123]
but the Chief Justice did not play an important role in
the process. A resounding opinion limiting arbitrary use
of the contempt power came from Taft's pen for a unanimous
court:
The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise
in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice
and in maintaining the authority of the court is most important
and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one and
care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions.[124]
In the field of civil liberties, Taft is remembered most
for his opinion in Olmstead v. United States (with Holmes,
Brandeis, Stone and Butler in dissent)~ holding that wiretapping
did not violate the Fourth Amendment:
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence
was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that
only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the
defendant.[125]
Olmestead would survive thirty years longer than Myers v.
United States, but ultimately would be overruled.[126]
Conclusions
Taft hoped to serve for a decade as Chief Justice, then
retire, and travel with his wife. He did not live to do
so, retiring February 3, 1930, as a result of the illness
which caused his death a month later. Nine other Chief Justices
have served longer than Taft, yet his impress upon the Office
of Chief Justice, the Supreme Court, and the federal court
system accords him consideration as one of the great "Chiefs."
After Taft each Chief Justice would be expected to perform
extensive duties other than deciding cases and heading the
Supreme Court. After Taft, the Chief Justice would be expected
by the Attorney General, the Congress, the bar and the general
public to take an active interest in the administration
of the federal court system, and to be a force in advancing
the needs of the third branch. No Chief Justice since Taft
has proven as audacious in conceiving his role, for Taft
had treated his job as an American Lord Chancellor—managing
a system, framing legislation and putting it through, selecting
judges, as well as presiding over a court and deciding cases.
But all Chief Justices since Taft have been involved with
the Judicial Conference of the United States, with legislation
effecting the federal courts, and with the rule-making process.
They have also had to spend some time managing the Supreme
Court building.
The Chief Justice who most resembles Taft is the present
incumbent, Warren E. Burger, who came to office ready to
address needs in judicial administration—federal and
state—with a program, tactics and tenacity evoking
memories of Taft. By the time he became Chief Justice, the
lower federal courts had emerged as a major force in American
governance. This would have occurred had Taft never been
Chief Justice, as a result of the centralization of American
government, Congress' increased reliance upon federal jurisdiction,
and the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, especially during
the 1960's. But Taft's legacy pointed the lower federal
courts towards modernization, and provided tools for management
and procedural reform which would be built upon by later
leaders — Charles Evans Hughes, Charles E. Clark and
Arthur Vanderbilt, Earl Warren and Tom Clark, Warren Burger
and Griffin Bell. Such management and reform enabled the
courts to survive overgenerous increases in their jurisdiction
coupled with frugality in providing the tools. Were Taft
alive today, he would approve the increased prestige of
the lower federal courts, and probably bewail much of their
jurisprudence.
Taft-the-Chancellor deserves the "high place among
judicial statesmen" which Justice Rehnquist gives him.[127]
Even Taft's old adversary, Felix Frankfurter, concluded
that:
[Taft] had a place in history ... next to Oliver Ellsworth,
who originally devised the judicial system. Chief Justice
Taft adapted it to the needs of a country that had grown
from three million to a hundred and twenty million.[128]
To the functioning of the Supreme Court, Taft brought administrative
talent and a gift for human relations. He could not eliminate
conflict, and would not dominate its product, but he did
minimize friction, establish a warm atmosphere, and mass
strong majorities for most of the decisions about which
he truly cared. His jurisprudence is not much with us, but
the certiorari jurisdiction and the "marble palace"
are.
The Court, "next to [his] wife and children" was
"the nearest thing to [his] heart in life."[129]
He wanted to make the Court a model for all other American
courts. His friend, Charles E. Barker, related an extraordinary
story Soon after Taft was appointed Chief Justice, he said
to Barker:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Old man, I guess you know this appointment as Chief Justice
is the crowning joy and honor of my life. Though it is an
honor, it means I shall have to work hard. The agenda of
cases before the Court is now several years behind, which
means that any litigant must wait a long time before his
case can even be heard. This is dead wrong, and it will
be my constant endeavor and ambition to bring the docket
up to date.[130]
Barker related that in January, 1930, during Taft's final
illness, the Chief Justice took his hand and said:
Old man, do you remember what I told you in Washington?
Well, I can report that my one great ambition as Chief
Justice has been accomplished. The docket is up to date,
so I guess I've earned a few weeks' rest.[131]
Whether or not the story is entirely accurate, Taft had
certainly earned that rest.
For Further Reading
William Howard Taft's activities as Chief Justice have been
the subject of studies by a number of distinguished political
scientists, among them Alpheus T. Mason, Walter F Murphy,
Peter is cited more thoroughly in the footnotes to this
article. The best overview of Taft as Chief Justice, as
well as one of the most satisfactory works ever written
about a member of the Supreme Court, is Mason's William
Howard Taft: Chief Justice. Murphy discussed Taft's work
in a number of places including his tour de force, Elements
of Judicial Strategy (Chicago & London: University of
Chicago Press, 1964). Fish chronicled Taft's role in federal
judicial administration in The Politics of Federal Judicial
Administration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1973). Taft's influence in the appointment of judges is
dealt with in Danelski's A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed:
The standard full-length biography of Taft is Henry F Pringle's
two-volume, the Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New
York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. 1939). Judith Icke Anderson
has written a provocative psycho-biography, William Howard
Taft (New York: W W. Norton & Co., 1981), which gives
detailed treatment of Taft's career only through his Presidency.
* However loyal to the entire "team," Taft did
hold rump conferences on some Sundays in his home with
the more conservative members of the Court, so that a
united front might be presented to Holmes. Brandeis and
Stone. See Walter E Murphy, "Marshaling the Court:
Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process,"
29 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 640, 670.
**While McKenna was not a "conservative" in the
way McReynolds or Van Devanter were, his replacement by
Stone strengthened the "liberal" wing of the Court.
* * * * * *
Endnotes
1. Address to the Pocatello, Idaho Chamber of Commerce,
New York Evening Post, October 6, 1911.
2. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1916).
3. (New York: Harper, 1914).
4. On Taft's Presidency see, e.g., Henry F. Pringle, Life
and Times of William Howard Taft (New York: Farrar and
Rinehart, 1939).
5. Judith Icke Anderson, William Howard Taft, (New York).
6. Id.
7. Alpheus T. Mason, William Howard Taft: Chief Justice
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1964), 32.
8. Willard L. King, Melvin Weston Fuller (New York: Macmillan,
1950), 303.
9. Quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p.
28.
10. See Jeffrey B. Morris, "Edward Douglass White
and President Taft's Court," YBK SCHS 1982, 27; Alexander
M. Bickel, "Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the Court,"
79 Yale L.J. 1 (1969); Daniel S. McHargue, "President
Taft's Appointments to the Supreme Court," 12 J.
of Pol. 478 (1950).
11. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 14.
12. Peter Graham Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial
Administration (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1973), 24.
13. Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court (New York: MacMillan Co., 1928),
156.
14. Quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra, n. 7,
p. 56.
15. Remarks of W. H. Taft, Proc. Judicial Section, 41
ABA Rpts. 741 (1916).
16. Taft to Justice William H Moody, July 8, 1910, quoted
in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 34. On the
appointment of White, see Morris, "Edward Douglass
White and President Taft's Court," supra n. 10, pp.
33-37.
17. The description is from Charles Evans Hughes and is
recorded in (ed.) Joseph P. Lash, From the Diaries of
Felix Frankfurter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), April
25, 1947, p. 313.
18. 38 Stat. 803.
19. Willis Van Devanter to William Howard Taft, May 11,
1927, quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7,
108-09 at 109.
20. Id. The Act is contained in 39 Stat. 726.
21. Oliver Wendell Holmes to Lewis Einstein, Jan. 6, 1908,
in (ed.) James Bishop Peabody, The Holmes-Einstein Letters
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 31 at 32.
22. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, 233.
23. Ibid., 120.
24. Henry P. Chandler, "Some Major Advances in the
Federal Judicial System," 31 FRD 307 at 320 (1963).
25. Ibid. at p. 318.
26. Ibid., at p. 319.
27. Frankfurter and Landis, The Business of the Supreme
Court, supra n. 13, p. 220.
28. William Howard Taft, "Adequate Machinery for
Judicial Business," 7 JABA 453 at 454 (1921).
29. Id.
30. 42 Stat. 837.
31. Walter F. Murphy, "Chief Justice Taft and the
Lower Court Bureaucracy: A Study in Judicial Administration,"
24 J. of Pol. 453 (1962).
32. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,
supra n. 12, p. 39. See also Peter G. Fish, "William
Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians
as Chief Judicial Reformers," 1975 Sup. Ct. Rev.
123.
33. Taft, "Adequate Machinery for Judicial Business,"
supra n. 28 at p. 454.
34. William Howard Taft, "To Unify the Federal Judges,"
5 J. Am. Judic. Soc. No. 2 (Aug. 1921) 37 at 39.
35. 41 Stat. 837, 839. See Fish, The Politics of Federal
Judicial Administration, supra n. 2, p. 33.
36. William J. Cibes, "Extra-Judicial Activities
of Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1960"
(Ph.D., Princeton University, 1975), IV, 1321.
37. William Howard Taft, "Three Needed Steps of Progress,"
8 ABAJ 34, 35 (1922).
38. Id.
39. Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Act of June 19, 1934,
48 Stat. 1064. See also 295 U.S. 774 ( ); 302 U.S. 783
( ); 308 U.S. 645 (1938); 28 U.S.C. 2072.
40. Warren E. Burger, "Deferred Maintenance of Judicial
Machinery," Remarks at National Conference on the
Judiciary, Williamsburg, Virginia, March 12, 1971, p 14.
41. 26 Stat. 826.
42. To Woodrow Wilson, September 9, 1922, quoted in Mason,
William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, pp. 165-7.
43. Taft, "Three Needed Steps of Progress,"
supra n. 37, p. 35.
44. William Howard Taft's testimony before the House Committee
on the Judiciary in Frankfurter and Landis, The Business
of the Supreme Court, supra n. 13, pp. 250-1, n. 50.
45. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 218.
46. Ibid., p. 112.
47. Id.
48. "The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1932," Harv. L. Rev. 245, 249 (1933).
49. William H. Rehnquist, "Chief Justices I Never
Knew," 3 Hast. Const. L.Q.
50. David J. Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice is Appointed
(New York: Random House, 1963), p. 33.
51. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,
supra n. 12, pp. 24ff.
52. Ibid., pp. 61, 62, 69. Compare with Mark W. Cannon
and Warren I. Cikens, "Interbranch Cooperation in
Improving the Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation,"
34 W & L L. Rev. 1 (1981) and Warren E. Burger, "Remarks
Accepting the Fordham-Stein Award," New York City,
Oct. 25, 1978.
53. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,
supra n. 13, p. 80.
54. Murphy, "Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy," supra n. 31, pp. 471-2.
55. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,
supra n. 12, p. 77.
56. William Howard Taft to Clarence H Kelsey, Aug. 17,
1923, quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft , supra n.
7, p. 276.
57. Root to Taft, Sept. 9, 1922, quoted in Ibid., p. 276.
58. Ibid., p. 129.
59. Fish, The Politics of Federal Judicial Administration,
supra n.12, p. 50.
60. Ibid., p. 51.
61. Ibid., p. 49.
62. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 278.
63. Chandler, "Some Major Advances in the Federal
Judicial System," supra n. 24, p. 356ff.
64. May 2, 1921, quoted in Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice
is Appointed, supra n. 50, pp. 33-4.
65. May 6, 1921, quoted in Ibid., p. 34.
66. Murphy, "Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy," supra n. 31, pp. 462-63. See also Walter
F. Murphy, "In His Own Image: Mr. Chief Justice Taft
and Supreme Court Appointments," 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
159.
67. Murphy, "Chief Justice Taft and the Lower Court
Bureaucracy," supra n. 31, pp. 462-63.
68. Marvin Schick, Learned Hand's Court (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).
69. William Howard Taft to W. J. Moore, July 30, 1921,
in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 287.
70. William Howard Taft to Helen H. Taft, Sept. 25, 1923,
in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, pp. 274-75.
71. William J. Cibes, "Extracurricular Activities
of Justices of the United States Supreme Court,"
supra n. 36, at V, 1852 n. 173.
72. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 233.
73. Quoted in Walter F. Murphy, "Marshaling the Court:
Leadership, Bargaining, and the Judicial Process,"
26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 640 at 641 (1962). See also David J.
Danelski, "The Influence of the Chief Justice in
the Decisional Process," in C. Herman Pritchett and
Walter F. Murphy, Courts, Judges and Politics (New York:
Random House, 1961), 497-508.
74. Danelski, "The Influence of the Chief Justice
in the Decisional Process," supra n. 73, pp. 502-03.
75. May 27, 1921, in (ed.) Mark De Wolfe Howe, Holmes-Laski
Letters (Cambridge, Mass.: Howard University Press, 1953),
339 at 340.
76. July 11, 1921, in (ed.) Mark De Wolfe, Holmes-Pollock
Letters (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1941),
II, 72.
77. October 9, 1921, in (ed.) Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters,
supra n. 75, p. 373.
78. December 22, 1921, in Ibid., p. 390.
79. May 3, 1922, in Ibid., p. 423.
80. May 21, 1922, in (ed.) Howe, Holmes-Pollock Letters,
supra n. 76, II, 96.
81. February 27, 1923, in Ibid., II, 113-14.
82. William Howard Taft to Robert A. Taft, May 3, 1925,
quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft , supra n. 7, p.
199.
83. Holmes to Laski, in (ed.) Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters,
supra n. 75, p. 797.
84. June 6, 1926, in Ibid., II, 848.
85. Felix Frankfurter, "Chief Justices I Have Known"
in (ed.) Philip B. Kurland, Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme
Court (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1970), 471 at 488.
86. June 15, 1929, in (ed.) Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters,
supra n. 75, p. 1158.
87. 280 U.S. v (1930).
88. The story is told in David J. Danelski "A Supreme
Court Justice Steps Down," 54 Yale Rev. 411.
89. Albert P. Blaustein and Roy M. Mersky, The First One
Hundred Justices (Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1978), 148.
90. Mason, William Howard Taft , supra n. 7, p. 231.
91. William Howard Taft to Robert A. Taft, March 4, 1928,
quoted in Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 195.
92. See Danelski, "The Influence of the Chief Justice
in the Decisional Process," supra n. 73, p. 499;
Frankfurter, "Chief Justices I Have Known,"
supra 85, 471 at 487; Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice
is Appointed, supra n. 50 p. 36.
93. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 117.
94. Danelski, "The Influence of the Chief Justice
on the Decisional Process," supra n. 73, p. 505.
95. See Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, pp. 223,
204.
96. See generally Danelski, A Supreme Court Justice is
Appointed, supra n. 50.
97. William Howard Taft, "Mr. Wilson and the Campaign,"
10 Yale Rev. 1, 19-20 (1920) quoted in Mason, William
Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 158.
98. Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 136.
99. See Catherine Hetos, "The Supreme Court Gets
a Home," YBK SCHS 1976, p. 25ff; see also Mason,
William Howard Taft, n. 7, pp. 133-37.
100. See generally Peter G. Fish, "William Howard
Taft and Charles Evans Hughes," supra n. 32.
101. See, e.g., Walter Murphy, "Marshaling the Court,"
supra n. 73, p. 642.
102. See Mason, William Howard Taft, supra n. 7, p. 206.
103. Alfred A. Kelly, Winfred A. Harbison and Herman Belz,
The American Constitution, Its Origin and Development
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 6th rev. ed. 1983),
454.
104. John E. Semonche, Charting the Future, The Supreme
Court Responds to a Changing Society, 1890-1920 (Westport,
Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), 423.
105. Ibid., pp. 424-25.
106. Fish, "William Howard Taft and Charles Evans
Hughes," supra n. 32 at 143 n. 108.
107. Semonche, Charting the Future, supra n. 104, p. 424.
108. 262 U.S. 522 (1923).
109. Unsigned editorial, New Republic, June 7, 1923, reprinted
as "Exit the Kansas Court," in (ed.) Kurland,
Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra n. 85, at
p. 140.
110. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
111. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
112. 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
113. Unsigned editorial, New Republic, Jan. 18, 1922,
reprinted as "Taft and the Supreme Court," in
Kurland, Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra
n. 85, pp. 49, 52 at p. 59.
114. 257 U.S. 184 (1921).
115. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
116. See, e.g., Professor Frankfurter, "The Coronado
Case," New Republic, Aug. 16, 1922, reprinted in
Kurland, Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra
n. 85, p. 228.
117. 258 U.S. 495, 515, 516 (1922).
118. Id. at 518-519.
119. Felix Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court and the
Interstate Commerce Commission," New Republic, Jan.
20, 1932, reprinted in Kurland, Felix Frankfurter on the
Supreme Court, supra n. 85, at p. 228.
120. 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923).
121. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
122. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935).
123. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
124. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 255 ( ).
125. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
126. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127. Rehnquist, "Chief Justice I Never Knew,"
supra n. 49, p. 637 at p. 648.
128. Frankfurter, "Chief Justices I've Known,"
in (ed.) Kurland, Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court,
supra n. 91, at p. 488.
129. William Howard Taft to H. S. Pritchett, April 25,
1923.
130. Charles Edwin Barker, With President Taft in the
White House (Chicago: A. Knoch, 1947), 69.
131. Ibid., p. 71.
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