continued from Part I …

Sherman was moving toward Richmond, and another army was moving toward Richmond, and another army was moving from Wilmington.

The war had so diminished the resources of the Confederacy to recruit their armies was not practicable. A Northern report informs us that the Confederate DEAD amounted to 133,821 of men killed in battle or who had died in hospital; the prisoners paroled on the field amounted to 348,599. There were in Northern prisons soldiers able to supply three armies as large as the Army of Northern Virginia. The Army of Norther Virginia after January, 1865, could not obtain recruits west of the Savannah river. At that date the United States had more of colored troops enlisted than the Confederate States had in the field in Virginia and the Carolinas. The state of the Commissariat had been a subject of anxiety during all of the war. Congress did not, until the month of March, 1865, pass any law to take possession and control of the railroads.

The blockade during the first years of the war was easily evaded. The reports of a few cases in the English law reports show that the profits were marvelous. One vessel (the Robert E. Lee) in a few months saved the Confederate States about $30,000,000 of their currency.

Finally the blockade was complete. The Confederacy suffered because of the inferiority of arms, munition, clothing, medicines, and hospital stores and other necessaries. The destruction of animals impaired the cavalry and artillery service. There was, in my opinion, full justification for the opinion that peace on the precise terms offered at the Hampton Roads Conference, if none better could be obtained, should have been accepted. The precise grounds assumed by the executive department was that nothing could be done on the basis disclosed in the report for want of any authority on the part of the Confederate administration. A convention of the States could not be assembled by any means within the reach of the Government of the Confederacy at this period.

Without any consultation with the Secretary of War (General John C. Breckenridge), I addressed to him a letter dated 5th March, 1865, after hearing from the deputation or committee of Senators the conclusion of the President. The Committee was composed of Messrs. Orr, Hunter, Barnwell, and W.A. Graham -- two Senators from South Carolina, one from Virginia, and one from North Carolina. These were all men of conspicuous ability and character. A copy of this letter I have submitted attached to this paper. With the letter addressed to the Secretary of War there was evidence of the entire exhaustion of the Treasury department, and a copy of the memoranda of the Hampton Roads Conference.

LETTER TO WILLIAM A. GRAHAM.2

WAR DEPARTMENT, 24th February, 1865

HON. WILLIAM A. Graham,

Senate of the Confederate States:

I understand the position of Mr. Lincoln to be that he will not make any treaty or agreement with the Confederate States, but only that he will treat or confer with individuals resisting the National authority, and will declare to them the terms on which he will make an adjustment. I do not consider that this position of his will prevent the settlement of the conditions.

In any event the action of Congress (U.S.) might be required to carry into effect the stipulations, and whether these are informally agreed to, or are formally made, it is presumed will not make a wide difference in the final result.

The stipulations that the President can settle under his powers as President, it is material to consider. He is the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and has exercised a large share of power as such; he has the power of pardon by the Constitution, and the Acts of Confiscation provide: "That the President may, by proclamation, extend to persons who may have participated in the existing rebellion in any State, or part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for the public welfare." The Act of Congress of the United States of the 16th day of July, 1862, embodies the principle of the provisions that have been made to Confiscation.

This Act provides: That to insure the speedy termination of the present rebellion, it shall be the duty of the President of the United States to cause the seizure of all the estate and property, moneys, stocks, credits and effects of the persons mentioned, and to apply the same and the proceeds thereof to the use of the army. The proceedings are to be in rem in any District Court of the United States, or in the District of Columbia, and the property to be sold under decrees of condemnation.

There is another Act on this subject upon captured and abandoned property, and provides for its sale, &c., &c., and that the party interested may reclaim the proceeds after the war upon proof of loyalty.

I think the effect of amnesty would be to relieve all property from the operation of the law of confiscation. My impression is that it would have the effect to destroy the judicial sales made under it. These sales were made before any conviction, and without service of process, on the party, and it is difficult to realize how the Act can be supported against one claimed to be a citizen, and whose loyalty is vouched by a Presidential pardon.

In this connection all fines and penalties incurred by any visitation of revenue laws would have to be considered, and a release from arrears of taxes and duties. A clause in the Act of 7th of June, 1862, is to this effect: "That the title of and into each parcel of land upon which said tax has not been paid as above provided, shall thereupon become forfeited to the United States and upon the sale thereafter shall vest in the United States, or in the purchasers in said sale in fee simple, free and discharged from all prior liens, encumbrances, right, title and dues whatsoever."

There are some conditions precedent to the operation of this Section of the Act which, perhaps, have not yet been fulfilled, but another Section imposes a lien upon the lands which does not depend upon any condition.

The arrears of taxes for three years, and the stringent conditions of the Act, will occasion the forfeiture of a large amount of property for taxes if the collection of the arrears is insisted on. There is another Act on this subject upon captured and abandoned property and provides for its sale, &c., &c., and that the party interested may reclaim the proceeds after the war upon proof of loyalty.

I think the effect ot amnesty would be to relieve all property from the operation of the law of confiscation. My impression is that it would have the effect to destroy the judicial sales made under it. These sales were made before any confiscation, and without service of process on the party, and it is difficult ot realize how the Act can be supported against one claimed to be a citizen, and whose loyalty is vouched by a presidential pardon.

In this connection all fines and penalties incurred by any visitation of revenue laws would have to be considered, and a release from arrears of taxes and duties. A clause in the Act of 7th of June, 1862, is to this effect: "That the title of, and into each parcel of land upon which said tax had not been paid as above provided, shall thereupon become forfeited to the United States, and upon the sale thereafter shall vest in the United States, or in the purchasers in said sale in fee simple, free and discharged from all prior liens, encumbrances, right, title and dues whatsoever."

There are some conditions precedent to the operation of this section of the Act, which, perhaps, have not yet been fulfilled, but another section imposes a lien upon the lands which does not depend upon any condition.

The arrears of taxes for three years, and the stringent conditions of the Act will occasion the forfeiture of a large amount of property for taxes if the collection of the arrears is insisted on.

The legislation upon the subject of slavery in the District of Columbia, in the territories, forts, arsenals and the repealing of the fugitive slave Acts. Besides these there is an Act to liberate all slaves in places captured by the United States, and the penal provisions of several of the Acts of Congress provide specially for the emancipation of slaves of the owner. Western Virginia was admitted to the Union in 1862, in December. It purports to have been done upon the consent of the people of that section, and of the Legislature of the State. In a number of the States, the public lands have been appropriated by the State as Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Arkansas, and in others a portion of the public money of the United States was seized.

I suppose that an arrangement as to these would be required. The commissioner being empowered to settle the terms of peace upon the recognition of the national authority, would have to consider very carefully the laws that have been made since July 1st, 1861. Besides these arrangements, the disbanding of the army; the adjustment of the public debt; the disposition of the public property; the admission of the States into fellowship; the suppression of governments that have grown up during the war, and affairs connected with the internal policy of the States should command attention. I cannot see that order can be fully restored, without a long interval between the decision to reconstruct the Union, and the consummation of that act.

I question whether this will be agreed to, but wise statesmanship clearly indicates that it would be better that this should be adopted as the mode of procedure.

Very respectfully,

(Signed,) J.A. CAMPBELL

LETTER TO GENERAL J.C. BRECKENRIDGE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND,

March 5th, 1865.

GENERAL J.C. BRECKENRIDGE, Secretary of War.

Sir: --

The present condition of the country requires, in my opinion, that a full and exact examination be made into the resources

of the Confederate Government available for the approaching campaign, and that accurate views of our situation be taken.

It is not the part of statesmanship to close our eyes upon them.

The most important of these is the state of the finances. This department is in debt from four to five hundred millions of dollars. The service of all of its bureaus is paralyzed by want of money and credit.

The estimates for this year amount to $1,048,858,275. This only includes an estimate of six months for the Commissary Department, and excludes 135,000 pounds sterling for the nitre and mining service. These being included, the estimate would be $1,338,858,275 Confederate notes. The currency is, at the Treasury valuation 60 to 1 as compared with coin, and when the small stock of coin in the Treasury is expended, and the sales of which now control the market, no one can foretell the extent of the depreciation that will ensue.

It is needless to comment on these facts.

2. Second only to the question of finance, and perhaps of equal importance, is the condition of the armies as to men. In April, 1862, the revolutionary measure of conscription was resorted to, the men between 18 and 35 were then placed in service. The eventful campaign of 1862 compelled the addition of the class between 35 and 40 to the call of April. The campaign that terminated in July, 1863, with the loss of Vicksburg, and the disaster at Gettysburg, made a call for the men between 40 and 45 necessary. In February, 1864, the Conscript Act was made more stringent, and the population between 17 and 50 were made subject to call. At the same time, the currency was reduced one-third by taxation and heavy taxes were laid otherwise.

In October, 1864, all details of men for particular service were revoked. The casualties of war cannot be accurately ascertained, but enough is known to show that no large addition can be made from the conscript population. General Preston reports "that there are over 100,000 deserters scattered over the Confederacy. That so common is the crime, it has in popular estimation lost the stigma which justly pertains to it, and therefore the criminals are everywhere shielded by their families, and by the sympathies of many communities."

The States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and perhaps others, have passed laws to withdraw from service men liable to it under existing laws, and these laws have the support of local authorities. I think that the number of deserters is, perhaps, overstated, but the evil is one of enormous magnitude, and the means of the department to apply a corrective have diminished in proportion to its increase.

I do not regard the slave population as a source from which an addition to the army can be successfully derived. If the use of slaves had been resorted to in the beginning of the war, for service in the Engineer Troops and as teamsters and laborers, it might have been judicious. Their employment since 1862 has been difficult and latterly almost impracticable.

The attempt to collect 20,000 men has been obstructed and rendered nearly abortive. The enemy have raised about as many from the fugitives occasioned by the draft as ourselves from its execution. General Holmes reports 1,500 fugitives in one week in North Carolina. Colonel Blount reported a desertion of 1,210 last summer in Mobile, and Governor Clarke, of Mississippi, entreats the suspension of the call for them in that State.

As a practical measure, I cannot see how a slave force can be collected, armed and equipped at the present time.

In immediate connection with this subject is that of subsistence for the army. This has been attended with difficulty since the commencement of the war, in consequence of want of efficient control over the transportation, and the difficulty of funds. There were abundant supplies in the country at that time, and the transportation was fully adequate, but these were not under control. The Treasury has never answered the full demands of the Commissary Department with promptitude. These difficulties were aggravated when the currency became depreciated, and prices were determined by commissioners, so as to lighten the burden upon the Treasury and without reference to the market.

They have been still more aggravated by the subjugation of the most productive parts of the country, the devastation of other portions, and the destruction of railroads. Production has been diminished, and the quantity of supplies has been so much reduced that under the most favorable circumstances subsistence for the army would not be certain and adequate.

At present these embarrassments have become so much accumulated that the last Commissary General pronounces the problem of subsistence of the Army of Northern Virginia, in its present position, insoluble, and the present Commissary General requires the fulfillment of conditions, though not unreasonable, nearly impossible.

5. The remarks upon the subject of subsistence are applicable to the clothing, fuel and forage requisite for the army service, and in regard to the supplies of animals for cavalry and artillery service. The transportation by railroad south of this city is now limited to the Danville railroad. The present capacity of that road is insufficient to bring supplies adequate to the support of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the continuance of that road, even at its existing conditions, cannot be relied on. It can render no assistance in facilitating the movements of troops.

6. The Chief of Ordnance reports that he has a supply of 25,000 arms. He has been dependent on a foreign market for one-half of the arms used. This source is nearly cut off. His workshops, in many instances, have been destroyed, and those in use have been impaired by the withdrawal of details. He calls loudly for the withdrawal of men from the army to re-establish the efficiency of some of them. There is reason to apprehend that the most important of the manufactories of arms will be destroyed in a short time, and we have to contemplate a deficiency of arms and ammunition.

7. The foregoing observations apply to the Nitre and Mining Bureau, and the Medical Department is not in a better condition that the other bureaus. The armies in the field in North Carolina and Virginia do not afford encouragement to prolong resistance.

General Lee reported a few days ago the desertion of some 1,200 veteran soldiers. Desertions have been frequent during the whole season, and the morale of the army is somewhat impaired. The causes have been abundant for this. Exposed to the most protracted and violent campaign that is known in history, contending against overwhelming numbers, badly equipped, fed, paid, and cared for in camp and hospital, with families suffering at home, this army has exhibited the noblest qualities. It sees everywhere else disasters and defeat, and that their toils sufferings have been unproductive. The Army of North Carolina can scarcely be regarded as an army. General Johnston has at Charlotte less than 3,000 dispirited disorganized troops, composed of brigades that are not as large as companies should be. General Hardee has a mixed command; only a small portion of it is efficient. The troops from the Tennessee have not arrived, and we can hope that they will arrive in good condition.

9. The political condition is not more favorable. Georgia is in a state that may be properly called insurrectionary against the Confederate authorities. Her public men of greatest influence have case reproach upon the laws of the Confederacy and the Confederate authorities, and have made the execution of the laws nearly impossible. A mere mention of the condition in Tennessee, Missouri, Kentucky, Western Virginia, and the line of the Mississippi, the seaboard from the Potomac to the Sabine and North Alabama, is necessary. North Carolina is divided, and her divisions prevent her from taking upon herself the support of the war, as Virginia had done. With the evacuation of Richmond the State of Virginia must be abandoned. The war will cease to be a national one from that time. You cannot but have perceived how much of the treasure, of the hopes and affectations of the people of all the States, has been deposited in Virginia, and how much the national spirit has been upheld by the operations here. When this exchequer becomes exhausted, I fear that we shall be bankrupt, and that the public spirit in the South and South-western States will fail.

It is the province of statesmanship to consider of these things.

The South may succumb, but it is not necessary that she should be destroyed. I do not regard reconstruction as involving destruction, unless our people should forget the incidents of their heroic struggle and become debased and degraded. It is the duty of their statesmen and patriots to guard them in the future with even more care and tenderness than they have done in the past. There is anarchy in the opinions of men here, and few are willing to give counsel, and still fewer are willing to incur the responsibility of taking or advising action. In these circumstances I have surveyed the whole ground, I believe calmly and dispassionately. The picture I do not think has been too highly colored. I do not ask that my views be accepted, but that a candid inquiry be made with a view to action. I recommend that General Lee be requested to give his opinion upon the condition of the country, upon a submission of these facts, and that the President submit the subject to the Senate, or to Congress, and invite their action.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed,) JOHN A. CAMPBELL,

Assistant Secretary of War.

At the same time there was delivered to the Secretary of War a copy of the Memorandum of the Conference at Hampton Roads, made by me; also, an endorsement of Mr. Trenholm, Secretary of the Treasury, to the effect that he had exhausted all of the authority to issue treasury notes, the 31st of December, 1864, and had been selling gold since, to supply urgent wants. That when the supply of gold had been disposed of, the operations of the treasury must close. The amount of hand on the 19th of February was only $750,000.

This statement of the Secretary was made to the President of the Confederate States, upon application of the Quartermaster General for $100,000, to purchase horses and equipments for the artillery, which he represented to be indispensable. The President declined to make the appropriation of the sum asked for.

(Signed,) J.A.C.

The subsequent history is that Genal J.C. Breckenridge, after the letter and documents had been explained and delivered to him, required of all the Chiefs of Bureaus in the Department to report to him the condition of his Department, and his ability to fulfil the demands likely to be made.

The Quartermaster General, the Commissary General, so the Chiefs of Ordnance, Nitre and Mining and Conscription, General Lee, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies in the Field, was also required to do so. Each one of these made his report, and some a supplemental report, because of changes in the conditions.

The letter of General Lee was clear and explicit. Referring to the state of his Commissariat, his inability to help himself to a single ration for his army, his absolute dependence on Richmond; referring to the exhausted and enfeebled armies of Johnston, Hardee, Hood, Taylor, and their inability to meet the demands on them. He said that his condition was such that, if it were not greatly improved, he could neither hold his lines before Richmond, nor could he move with his army from them.

These returns were submitted by the Secretary of War to the President. They were the subject of discussion, and were then enclosed in an envelope and submitted to the Congress at its last meetings, about the 14th of March, 1865. There was no discussion there, and the message was probably subsequently captured.]

General Weitzel, the commander who entered Richmond, stated to the writer that he had captured it.

The resolution of Mr. Rives was held by Senator Graham, of North Carolina, who assented to the conditions of supreme and unreasoning necessity which existed, and that there was no time to be lost. The night of the adjournment he returned that paper to me, and informed me that the Senators had said that were the resolution to be passed there would be no action taken, and so that nothing could be done of advantage.

(Signed,) J.A. CAMPBELL

THE RESOLUTION OF MR. WILLIAM C. RIVES, OF VIRGINIA.

The Senate of the Confederate States, cherishing with undiminished attachment the cause of national independence, but convinced by a careful and conscientious study of their situation, compared with the overwhelming numbers and unlimited resources of their adversary, increased by accessions from every part of Europe, and favored by the partial and unjust policy of foreign powers, that a longer prosecution of the war with any reasonable prospect of success on their part has become impracticable; and yielding, as the proudest and most valiant of nations have done in like circumstances to the stern law of necessity, and the apparent decrees of Heaven; do, in order to prevent a farther and unavailing effusion of blood, to husband the lives and interests of so many of their fellow-citizens committed to their guardianship, and avert the horrors of a savage and relentless subjugation by a triumphant armed force of every race and complexion, advise the President to propose to the enemy through the General-in-Chief, an armistice, preliminary to the re-establishment of peace and union, and for the special purpose of settling and ascertaining certain points incident thereto, to restoration of the Union, and particularly whether the seceded States on their return, will be secured in their rights and privileges as States, under the Constitution of the United States.

The foregoing was endorsed as follows: "This resolution was prepared by William C. Rives, of Virginia." It was handed by me (J.A.C.) to William A. Graham, to be offered to the Senate of the Confederate States, and returned to me without being offered. Mr. Rives prepared it at my request, and it had connection with the letter to General Breckenridge written by me and which Mr. Rives approved.

I delivered the letter to the Secretary of War who adopted the counsel that it contained. He addressed a letter to General Lee, and to each of the Chiefs of Bureaus in the Department of War, viz: the Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Commissary-General, Chief of Ordnance, &c.

1. General Lee answered in effect: The situation is full of peril and difficulty and required prompt action. He stated that he had gleaned the territory within the reach of his army transportation, and was wholly dependent upon the officers at Richmond for his supplies. He could not assist them to collect supplies; they knew better than he did what could be done. But, that if his situation was not greatly improved, he could neither hold his lines before Richmond nor could he remove from them; that he had no exact reports of the situation of General Johnston's army in North Carolina. He thought it had not been fully organized, but he feared it was not adequate to fulfil the demand upon it. That General Taylor's army was insufficient to perform the duties incumbent on it.

2. The Quartermaster-General answered that, the Richmond and Danville Railroad was his main dependence for the transportation of supplies; that the capacity of that road was barely sufficient to enable him to maintain the army and city of Richmond; that if it was confided to him for that purpose only, he thought it could be done; but if withdrawn, to aid in the movement of troops or other uses, he should not be able to do so. With the papers, an application to the President to direct the use of $100,000 in gold to the purchase of horses and harness for the artillery service; that treasury notes were uncurrent and other provisions must be made. The President referred it to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary answered, that on the 31st December, 1864, he had issued the entire sum which he was authorized to issue. That since that date he had purchased Confederate notes to meet the most urgent demands, at the rate of sixty dollars for one in gold. That when the stock of gold was exhausted his department must close. That he had only $750,000.

3. The Commissary-General (St. John) answered that there were commissary supplies in the territory within the lines of Richmond; Goldsborough, North Carolina; Charlotte, North Carolina, and Staunton, Virginia. That were this territory protected so that his officers and agents might move easily and purchase, and have sufficient local and railroad transportation and be furnished with gold, he could perform the work of collecting supplies for the army and the city of Richmond.

4. The Chief of Ordnance and the Surgeon-General referred to the effect of the exclusion of intercourse with foreign nations and the grave inconvenience of the closure of our own ports to them. The chief of Ordnance also represented the damage that had happened to his service by the orders revoking the details of the men who had been engaged for duty in his department. His supply of arms was reduced to 25,000 stand.

5. The Treasury Report for the year 1864 was withdrawn from the Congress, and the Secretary in the conditions which existed disclosed a hopeless state of insolvency. The President in his last message in March, 1865, exhibits very clearly that the Treasury could not be set up. There was no treasure wherewith to fill it, or even to veil its nudity. The purse, and the arsenal, and the camp, and magazine, and conscript recruits, were all wanting in the Confederate States. A philosopher and historian of this time records: "A political party that knows not when it is beaten, may become one of the fatalest of things to itself and to all." The same philosopher says, "O patriotism! It is he who has to pay all scores, run up by whomsoever; on him must all breakages and charges fall." We have proved these aphorisms.

The paper issues that went forth from the Treasury, probably amounted to two billions and upwards. It is probable that there had been no payments to the men of the army for two years. General Kirby Smith from the Trans-Mississippi department sent a single requisition of $60,000,000 in September, 1864. The answer to him NO EFFECTS. The purpose of the letter addressed to Secretary Breckenridge was to ascertain whether Congress might not find in the lines of the Constitution a power to make a peace when the necessity appeared. The testimony was collected where information could certainly be found, and which was certainly trustworthy.

It was submitted in advance to the head of the War Department, and to several of the most enlightened statesmen in the Confederate States.

The Secretary of War caused the papers to be submitted to the Cabinet of the President. They were placed in an envelope endorsed "Secret Message of Congress."

There was no statement of this testimony nor reference to it in the President's Message. There was quite an elaborate message sent at the same time, probably, to the same secret session. This message reviews with vigor and asperity the conduct of the Congress, and finds some things had been undone that were of imperative necessity to the public safety, and should have been done.

This message was referred to a select committee of five of the Senate, and their response displays vigor and asperity. I annex to this paper both documents. The message of the President and the response of the Committee of the Senate occupied the thoughts of the last two days of the last Congress of the Confederate States. It ended March 15, 1865. The history of the remainder of this month was that of a busy time. The exchange of prisoners had been going on. Without reference to exact interchange, all of the prisoners accumulated in Richmond were sent away on the vessels. Some battles took place, in which the Confederates suffered disastrously, and on the 1st of April there was a defeat which was fatal and final, and the precursor and necessary cause of a capitulation within the week which followed.

Richmond was evacuated the 2d of April, and was captured on the 3d of April. I informed the Secretary of War that I should not leave Richmond, and that I should take an opportunity to see President Lincoln on the subject of peace and would be glad to have an authority to do so, but that I would do so if an occasion arose. President Lincoln came to the city on the 4th of April, in less than forty-eight hours from the departure of the President and his Cabinet. Richmond had experienced a great calamity from a conflagration. I represented the conditions to him and requested that no requisitions on the inhabitants to be made of restraint of any sort save as to police and preservation of order; not to exact oaths, interfere with churches, &c. He assented to this. The General Weitzel and Military Governor Shepley cordially assenting.

On the following day I visited him on the Malvern gunboat on which he had come into Richmond upon the 4th. He had prepared a paper which he commented on as he read each clause. The paper was not signed nor dated. This paper he handed to me, and on the 13th of April I returned it ot General Ord by direction of the President. I retained a copy as I informed that General I should do. This is a copy: --

"1. As to peace I have said before and now repeat that three things are indispensable. The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States.

"2. No receding by the Executive of the United States on the slavery question from the position assumed thereon in the late annual message to Congress and in preceding documents.

"3. No cessation of hostilities short of an end of hostilities and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government."That all propositions coming from those now in hostility to the government and not inconsistent with the foregoing, will be respectfully considered and passed upon in a spirit of sincere liberality. I now add that it seems useless for me to be more specific with those who will not say that they are ready for the indispensable terms, even on condition to be named by themselves. If there be any who are ready for those indispensable terms on any condition whatever let them say so, and state their conditions, so that such conditions can be distinctly known and considered. It is further added that the remission of confiscation being within the executive power, if the war be now further persisted in by those opposing the government, the making of confiscated property, at the least, to bear the additional cost will be insisted on; but that confiscations (except in case of third party intervening interests) will be remitted to the people of any State which shall now promptly, and in good faith, withdraw its troops and other supports from further resistance to the government. What is …

please proceed to Part III, pp. 61-80