Presidents
versus the Court
ROBERT
W. LANGRAN
Under the
American constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
the executive, legislative and judicial branches of
government are independent of each other in their assigned
areas of authority. However, since the Supreme Court
is the final interpreter of the Constitution, enactments
of Congress periodically are tested for validity under
the process of judicial review. As for acts of Presidents,
these have been rarely but spectacularly dealt with
when the Court has had occasion to review them.
Andrew Jackson's aphorism, "John Marshall has made
his decision; now let him enforce it," turned out
to be little more than presidential bravado. In the
few confrontations between the judiciary and the Chief
Executive, the latter has usually come off second best.
The following nineteenth-century instances will illustrate
the point.
Marshall
v. Jefferson:
Marbury
v. Madison
The
first time the Supreme Court dealt with the
President was in the famous case of Marbury v. Madison
in 1803. The Federalist party had been defeated
in the 1800 elections by the Jeffersonian Republicans,
losing control of the [residency and the Congress. In
order to insure keeping control of the judicial branch,
the Federalists passed two laws before they left office.
One was the Circuit Court Act of February 13, 1801 (repealed
thirteen months later by the Republicans), which created
six new circuit courts with a total of sixteen judges
(one of whom was James Marshall, John's brother), several
new district courts, and personnel to staff the courts
such as marshals and clerks. (See also "The Numbers
Game") The other law, passed on February 27, 1801,
let the President appoint as many justices of the peace
as he deemed necessary for the District of Columbia.
These people were the famous "Midnight Judges,"
to hold office for five years. John Adams named forty-two
of them.
One of the
appointed justices of the peace was William Marbury,
forty-one years of age and an aide to the Secretary
of the Navy Benjamin Stoddert. The commissions of office
were delivered to most of the forty-two while John Marshall
was the Secretary of State, but at midnight on March
3 the Administration changed hands and the new President,
Thomas Jefferson, told his acting Secretary of State,
Attorney General Levi Lincoln, to cease delivery of
the remaining commissions. Jefferson perceived the entire
matter to be grossly partisan in nature, and after examining
the matter decided on a list of thirty people to be
justices of the peace, of whom twenty-three were from
the original list of forty-two. Among those who did
not get the jobs were Marbury, Dennis Ramsay, William
Harper, and Robert Hooe (persons who might have gone
unnoticed in history save for this omission).
These four
men brought suit in the Supreme Court against the then-Secretary
of State James Madison to get the commissions of office
delivered to them. The action they took was a request
for a writ of mandamus, a court order compelling someone
to do something. Under the 1789 Judiciary Act this was
a remedy available to them. Congress, as mentioned previously,
did repeal the Circuit Court Act, and since federal
judges do hold office for life there was a constitutional
question as to what to do with the sixteen circuit judges.
In order to let the matter sit for awhile in the hope
that the controversy would subside, Congress in the
same bill told the Supreme Court it would not meet in
June for its regular session and could not meet again
until February of 1803, some eleven months from the
date of the bill. As fate would have it, nobody did
challenge the repeal bill and thus the matter would
have been put to rest except for the suit by Marbury
and friends.
John Marshall
was now the Chief Justice, having been placed there
by the outgoing President John Adams. Even though Jefferson's
name does not appear in the case, it still was a showdown
between the President and the Court. If Marshall and
his Court issued the writ, the President would tell
Secretary of State Madison to ignore it and the Court
would lose face, as it had no way of enforcing its order.
In fact, even today the Court must rely on the Executive
branch in the matter of enforcement. If, on the other
hand, the Court did not issue the writ, it would be
a clear victory for Jefferson. The fact that Marshall
and Jefferson were political and personal enemies made
the forthcoming decision even more momentous.
Despite
the seeming dilemma, Marshall and his Court came out
of the case with a decision which has to rank as a landmark.
The Court met on February 9, 1803, in the office of
the Clerk of the Senate. Present, besides Marshall,
were Justices Washington and Chase. The lawyer for the
plaintiffs was Charles Lee, former Attorney General
under Washington and Adams and, ironically, one of the
sixteen circuit judges whose jobs had been taken from
them by the repeal bill. Marshall called upon two clerks
from the State Department--Jacob Wagner and Daniel Brent--to
testify, but all they said was that they were unsure
as to the particular commissions which had been signed
and sealed but had not been delivered. Mr. Lincoln was
then called, but his testimony was the same as that
of the clerks. However, James Marshall, John's brother,
said in an affidavit that the commissions for the plaintiffs
had been properly sealed and signed (he had actually
been delivering the commissions that fateful midnight
and had those for Harper and Hooe in his possession
but just had not been able to get them to the appointees).
This seemed to all to be the evidence Marshall needed
to issue the writ, and on February 24 the Court rendered
its verdict.
Marshall,
to the surprise of most, denied the writ, even though
he said that Marbury and the others were entitled to
the office. He denied it because he said that that part
of the 1789 Judiciary Act which gave the Supreme Court
the power to issue writs of mandamus in cases of original
jurisdiction (meaning one can start the case at the
Supreme Court) was unconstitutional (an interesting
sidelight is that one of the Justices, Paterson, had
helped write that 1789 law). Marshall's reasoning was
that the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
is given in the Constitution, and therefore it cannot
be enlarged, as in this case, or diminished, except
by constitutional amendment. Thus, he gave up a power
which Congress had conferred upon the Court, but at
the same time he gave the Court its greatest power,
that of judicial review over federal laws; i.e., the
power to look at their constitutionality. At the same
time, also, he made it appear that Jefferson was morally
wrong in denying the commissions.
The Jeffersonians,
of course, only tried to emphasize that part of the
decision denying the writ, but nevertheless it was a
great victory for John Marshall and the Supreme Court.
And what happened to Marbury? He went on to become president
of a bank in the Georgetown section of Washington in
1814 and he died in 1835, the same year as John Marshall.
The Court, meanwhile, showed that it was impartial as
to which President it rebuffed in that the following
year, 1804, in the little-known case of Little v.
Barreme, it held a naval commander liable
in damages for injury to property he inflicted in carrying
out provisions of a proclamation of President John Adams
which the Court held was in excess of presidential power.
Marshall
v. Jefferson:
United
States v. Burr
The battle
between Marshall and Jefferson reached its peak in the
famous Aaron Burr treason trial in 1807, which was held
at John Marshall's Circuit Court for Virginia in Richmond.
The story began when Jefferson sent a message to Congress
in late 1806 in which he accused Burr of planning to
attack Mexico and to form his own empire there and with
the states west of the Alleghenies, which he would detach
from the Union. Two of Burr's conspirators, Erich Bollmann
and Samuel Swartwout, were in New Orleans and General
Wilkinson declared martial law there and arrested them.
Fearful that the Federalist-dominated judiciary would
release them, the Senate actually pushed through a bill
suspending the writ of habeas corpus but the House of
Representatives refused to go along with it. Accordingly,
the argument for issuance of the writ was presented
to the Court on February 10, 1807, ironically by the
same Charles Lee who had represented Marbury and the
others, and on February 14 Marshall and his Court issued
it. The men were brought to the Court on February 18,
and on February 21 Marshall ordered both men released
from custody, holding that there was not enough evidence
to convict them of treason and furthermore they had
committed nothing in Washington, D.C., the site of the
Court.
On March
30, 1807, Burr himself was brought before Marshall's
Circuit Court and he was bound over to the grand jury
on the misdemeanor charge of violating the neutrality
law. On June 24, however, the grand jury indicted him
not only for that but also for treason. Meanwhile, Marshall
had allowed bail to Burr over Jefferson's opposition.
The trial lasted from August 17 to September 3, with
the prosecuting United States Attorney being George
Hay. Burr moved that Marshall subpoena President Jefferson
to appear with certain important papers both in June
and in September, and both times Marshall did so, as
he felt he had that power. Jefferson, naturally, refused
to honor them on the grounds that it would jeopardize
the independence of the executive. He also added that
he, the President, had duties which were superior to
his duties as a citizen.
Marshall
proceeded to exclude most of the government's testimony
as not bearing on treason, whereupon the jury came in
with a verdict of not guilty because of the evidence
submitted. Marshall, relying heavily upon the arguments
of Burr and defense counsel Luther Martin, drew the
distinction between actually levying war against the
United States and merely advising or procuring. He felt
that advising or procuring was conspiracy, not treason.
He did admit that procuring might be treason, but that
would have to be charged in the indictment and proved
by two witnesses. The defense, of course, said that
it would be most difficult find two witnesses to such
a secret act as procuring an armed force, and Marshall
said that that still would not justify a conviction
without proof.
After the
verdict, the government dropped similar charges against
other conspirators, although Jefferson insisted that
Burr be charged with the misdemeanor of planning an
attack against Mexico, for which he was also adjudged
not guilty. The reaction by Jefferson to all this was
outrage, and it seems clear that he thought for awhile
about impeaching Marshall. In Congress, meanwhile, two
months after the verdict, an attempt was made to amend
the Constitution to impose a limited term of office
upon federal judges and also to enable the President
to remove a federal judge by a two-thirds vote in each
house of Congress. In addition, in1808 a special Senate
committee headed by John Quincy Adams issued a report
which assailed Marshall's rulings and also hinted at
the possibility of impeachment. Finally, a bill was
introduced to amend the law of treason; it was defeated.
Attention of the country then shifted from domestic
to foreign affairs and the controversy surrounding the
Burr trial subsided.
The Burr
controversy did not involve the entire Supreme Court,
only the Justice in whose circuit the trial actually
took place, and Justices no longer have to hold court
in their assigned circuits, but nevertheless it was
important in that while it allowed the President to
create the precedent of immunity from subpoenas, it
also showed that presidential enemies could not be jailed
on treason charges without actual proof as required
by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
and not just one Justice did take part in the Ex parte
Bollmann and Swartwout decisions which effectively
said same thing as did the Burr decision by Marshall.
The
Court v. Jackson:
Kendall
v. United States
Andrew Jackson
was no great enthusiast of the Supreme Court, as that
oft-quoted remark of his alluded to at the beginning
of the article will attest. His one skirmish with the
Court, however, came in a case involving his Postmaster
General, Amos Kendall, and the decision was rendered
after Jackson left the presidency. It also involved
the now-famous writ of mandamus.
Kendall
had revoked the settlement of certain claims of postal
contractors which had been made by his predecessors
in that office. When Mr. Stokes was not credited with
the entire amount of money due him he went to court.
He had a good case, because Congress had turned the
matter over to the Solicitor of the Treasury and he
had allowed all the claims, and Congress in turn provided
redress by private bill. As usual in a case of this
import the lawyers on each side were impressive. Richard
S. Coxe and Reverdy Johnson represented Kendall and
Francis Scott Key and Attorney General Butler represented
the government in its effort to force Kendall to pay
the claims. The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
issued the writ of mandamus against Kendall, and in
1838 the Supreme Court affirmed it.
All seven
Justices joined in the opinion by Justice Thompson,
which stated that there are some duties performed by
government officers such as cabinet members which are
political in nature and consequently fall under the
direction of the President. However, Congress may also
impose duties upon these people that they think proper
and which are not unconstitutional and in these cases
the law is controlling, not the President. Since the
case in question was the latter type mandamus was the
appropriate common law remedy to enforce that ministerial
duty which Kendall had violated. In addition, four of
the Justices said that the District of Columbia court
did have jurisdiction to so issue that writ, since it
was a general jurisdiction court. Other federal courts
did not gain that power until 1962.
When Justice
Thompson read the decision he implied in it that President
Jackson had believed that he could forbid the execution
of laws. Attorney General Butler objected to this, and
Thompson agreed to delete it from the printed
Court opinion even though he said that he felt
Butler had intimated it in his argument before the Court
and that Justices Baldwin, McKinley, and Wayne agreed
that Thompson had heard correctly.
As would
be expected, President Van Buren criticized the decision
in his annual message that December 3rd,
but Congress apparently saw nothing wrong in the decision
as it did not act on Van Buren's criticism. Although
the case did not involve the President as such, it did
involve an official of the United States appointed by
him, and the decision did create a precedent for asserting
claims against federal officials, still a continuing
problem.
Taney
v. Lincoln: The Civil War Cases
The Civil
War era brought President Abraham Lincoln and Chief
Justice Roger Taney into conflict with each other. It
was an almost-inevitable clash because both were strong-willed
persons thrust into the uniqueness of a Civil War situation
where crucial decisions had to be made, sometimes without
the luxury of a time period in which to think them through
and to get opinions from others.
The initial
conflict began in April 1861, when Lincoln told his
military commanders that they might suspend the writ
of habeas corpus in the area between Philadelphia and
Washington, as in that area he feared much sabotage.
One of the persons apparently engaging in such activities
was John Merryman, the president of the Maryland Agricultural
Society and an officer in that state's militia. He was
suspected of destroying bridges on the Northern Central
Railway and, in May, was arrested by the military and
confined to Fort McHenry under General Cadwalader on
a treason charge. Merryman applied to the Circuit Court
in Baltimore, which was run by Chief Justice Taney,
for a writ of habeas corpus. On May 27 Taney issued
the writ, but Cadwalader sent an aide to say that he
would not produce Merryman because his superior, Commanding
General of the Army Winfield Scott, had suspended habeas
corpus the month before on Lincoln's order. Taney ordered
Cadwalader to show cause the next day as to why he should
not be held in contempt, but when the general still
would not produce Merryman Taney rendered his momentous
opinion in the case of Ex parte Merryman.
The Court
ruled in favor of Merryman, stating that only Congress
could suspend habeas corpus. After delivering this opinion
verbally, Taney proceeded to put it in writing on June
1 for President Lincoln.
Meanwhile,
the marshal who went to the fort to get Merryman was
not allowed in. However, on July 4th Secretary
of War Cameron interviewed Merryman and on July 12th
he ordered him delivered to the marshal. During this
time Merryman was indicted for treason but he was released
on bond and never brought to trial. Altogether he spent
some forty-nine days in jail. President Lincoln responded
with a message to Congress in which he said that he
had inherent power to suspend habeas corpus, and in
August and September 1862, he did just that for all
rebels, all those engaging in disloyal practices, and
all those who interfered with enlistments and conscription.
Lincoln's action was fully supported by Attorney General
Edward Bates, who in a formal opinion in July 1861 had
stated that the President and the judiciary were equal
branches of government and as such might interpret the
Constitution differently. Lincoln, of course, believed
that he was defending the Constitution with his actions.
Congress supported Lincoln in March 1863, by allowing
him to suspend habeas corpus everywhere in the country.
In September 1863, the cabinet approved an order by
the War Department which told all military officers
that they might cite presidential authority whenever
they refused a habeas corpus writ. Taney, for his part,
simply refused to let any treason trials take place
in his Circuit Court without his presence, and he was
too ill for over a year to hear any cases.
Taney opposed
something else the government was doing during this
period. In order to help finance the war, the government
resorted to an income tax of 3% on personal income.
However, since the Constitution states that a federal
judge's salary may not be diminished while he holds
office Taney wrote a letter to Secretary of the Treasury
Chase (soon to succeed Taney as Chief Justice) saying
that it was illegal to deduct the income from federal
judges' salaries. The letter was written on February
16, 1863, and on March 10th Taney had it
entered into the Supreme Court's records. In 1872 Secretary
of the Treasury Boutwell ordered all the tax refunded,
agreeing completely with the then-departed Taney's opinion.
Also on
March 10th, 1863, the entire Supreme Court
had its first chance to adjudicate one of Lincoln's
Civil War actions. At issue was the April 19, 1861,
blockade of southern ports ordered by Lincoln and agreed
to by Congress on July 13, 1861. He had ordered the
blockade to halt the ships from carrying goods to the
Confederate States, and any ships seized by Union ships
were considered prizes. Since a number had been seized
the cases are called simply the Prize Cases
and the main question before the Court was whether
the President had the right to order the blockade. Justice
Robert Grier, speaking also for Justices Wayne, Swayne,
Miller, and Davis, said that Lincoln's action was proper.
He said that although a President does not have the
power to initiate war, once one has begun through an
insurrection the President was to act as he saw best
for the country without waiting for Congress. He has
this power as Commander-in-Chief. In fact, the reasoning
went on, the proclamation of the blockade showed that
a state of war existed which demanded such action.
The four
dissenters (Nelson, Catron, Clifford, and Taney) joined
together in an opinion written by Nelson in which they
insisted that the basic war power belonged to Congress,
and only after it had declared a war could something
such as a blockade be done. Therefore, the President
was wrong in his action, and even congressional ratification
of the seizures did not save him because it was an ex
post facto law and thus unconstitutional. According
to them, all ships seized between the presidential proclamation
and the act of Congress were seized illegally. Of course,
this was the minority opinion, but it took courage to
say this in the face of the Civil War events occurring
at the time. Perhaps that courage also permeated to
other courts, because on June 3, 1863, a circuit court
ordered a federal Provost-Marshal to return seized merchandise
or its value and to pay damage and costs, and on June
19, 1863, a court ruled illegal the government confiscation
of a box of dry goods on a ship. Some extreme Republicans
reacted to all this by attempting to legislate the Supreme
Court out of existence or to substitute judges they
liked for those they did not, but Lincoln's reaction
was merely to add the tenth Justice to the Supreme Court
as Congress had increased the number of seats on the
Court to that figure.
In February
1864, the Court would not review the sentence of a military
commission which had ordered Clement Vallandigham, a
civilian and in fact a former Democratic congressman
from Ohio, to close confinement during the war. He had
made a speech on May 1, 1863, critical of Lincoln for
what he said was needlessly prolonging the war. Under
an order issued the previous month by General Burnside,
who had Ohio as his command, persons who made speeches
such as that were subject to military arrest and procedure.
A Circuit Court refused to issue the writ of habeas
corpus and the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Vallandigham,
in a decision written by Justice Wayne, felt that
it could not hear cases from military commissions since
those commissions were not courts. Thus, the Supreme
Court was consistent in its refusal to upset actions
of the President taken while the war was in progress.
Such was not to be the case, however, once the war was
over and Lincoln had left the scene.
Chase
v. Johnson: Reconstruction Cases
In December
1866, the Court rendered its decision in the highly
celebrated case of Ex parte Milligan. Milligan
had been arrested on October 5, 1864, by the military
commander in Indiana, tried before a military commission
and convicted of conspiracy to release and arm rebel
prisoners and to then go with them into Kentucky and
Missouri in order to plan an invasion of Indiana. The
sentence was hanging, pronounced on May 18, 1865, but
President Andrew Johnson commuted it to life imprisonment
and Milligan petitioned for habeas corpus.
A unanimous
Court ruled that President Lincoln had had no right
to authorize the military commission to try civilians
in areas which are remote from the war where the civil
courts are open. Justice Davis, speaking this time for
himself and four others, also felt that even Congress
did not have the right to authorize this type of procedure.
He agreed that martial law might be used in an invasion,
but not in a threatened invasion. Chief Justice Chase,
speaking for himself and three others, did feel that
Congress could have authorized these military tribunals
in nonwar areas, even though in this case it had not
done so.
As for Milligan,
the Court held that since he had not been indicted by
a grand jury the
next time
it met, under the 1863 Habeas Corpus Act the government
had to release him. The decision was a clear victory
for civil liberties under the Constitution, and the
fact that it was unanimous attested to the courage and
integrity of the Court.
Also in
1866 the Court heard the case of Ex parte Garland,
dealing with the President's power to grant reprieves
and pardons. President Johnson's philosophy of Reconstruction
was much milder than the Radical Republicans' in Congress.
Among other acts, they had passed the Federal Test Act
in 1865 requiring all federal attorneys to take an oath
that they had never engaged in rebellion against the
United States, or given aid to rebels, or even expressed
any sympathy for their cause. In a five to four decision,
the Court held the act unconstitutional, holding it
both a bill of attainder (a legislative enactment declaring
guilt before the judicial process can take place) and
an ex post facto law. At the same time, the Court
held the President's pardoning power to be unlimited
except in cases of impeachment. It applies to all offenses
known to the law, and the President may utilize it at
any time, either before the legal proceedings are taken,
when they are pending, or after conviction and judgment.
Congress has no control over this presidential power.
In March
1867, Congress passed a series of Reconstruction statutes
over Johnson's veto, and on April 5 an equity suit was
brought by attorneys for the Johnson government in Mississippi
which was about to be replaced by a federal military
administration. The attorneys were Robert J. Walker,
Alexander H. Garland, and William L. Sharkey, and they
sought to enjoin President Johnson from enforcing those
acts in Mississippi on the grounds that the acts were
unconstitutional. The case, Mississippi v. Johnson,
marked the first time the Supreme Court had ever
been asked to stop a President from enforcing the law
as enacted by Congress, and even though he opposed the
laws, Johnson, through his Attorney General Stanbery,
said he would not comply with a decision enjoining him
from enforcing the laws. Stanbery also formally objected
to the filing of the suit.
The case
was argued on April 12, and on April 15 Chief Justice
Chase, speaking for a unanimous Court, held that the
Court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the President when
the President was engaging in major executive actions
such as carrying into effect a Congressional statute.
His reasoning was that those actions involve political
discretion and therefore an injunction would be interfering
with the political acts of the other two branches, and
defying it would create an absurd situation. If the
President obeyed it, then the legislative branch might
wish to take action against the President, such as impeachment.
Chase did feel that presidential actions of a ministerial
nature might be enjoined since they involved no discretion,
and he also felt that the decision applied to Congress
as well; i.e., the Court could not enjoin it either
when political discretion was involved.The decision
did not deter attorney Walker very long, as he then
joined in a suit one Charles O'Conoor on behalf of Mississippi
and Georgia to try to enjoin Secretary of War Stanton
and General Grant from enforcing the acts in those two
states. The case, Georgia v. Stanton, was argued
April 26, May 1, 3, and 6, and ten days later the Court
rendered the same decision as in the previous case in
that it dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that the rights being adjudicated were not of
persons or property, which is within the purview of
the Court, but were political in that they involved
sovereignty, and the Court does not deal in political
questions. The Mississippi counsel then tried to amend
the suit to show that the state had a property interest
in the case, but the Court denied it in a split four-four
vote (Justice Wayne, Clifford, Nelson, and Field would
have allowed the amended suit, but Chief Justice Chase
and Justices Swayne, Miller, and Davis were opposed,
and Justice Grier was absent).
The following
year the Court again became quite controversial when
a Mississippi editor by the name of McCardle was arrested
and held for trial by a military commission under an
early Reconstruction act. On January 17, 1868, the Court
accepted a habeas corpus petition and set the case for
March 2. However, on March 5 Chief Justice Chase had
to leave the Court to preside over President Johnson's
impeachment trial in the Senate, so on the 9th
the Court merely said that it would take the case under
advisement. Congress became fearful that the Court would
use this case to invalidate the Reconstruction Acts
and so just three days later rushed through a bill withdrawing
from the appellate jurisdiction of the Court all cases
arising under the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act, even those
which the Court had already taken, as in the matter
of McCardle. As expected, Johnson vetoed it on the 25th,
and the next day the Senate overrode him 33-9, and the
day after that the House overrode him 115-57, thus making
the bill into law. Johnson was acquitted in May, but
the Court did not get around to rendering a decision
as to whether Congress could take away its appellate
jurisdiction even on cases already taken until April
12, 1869. At that time, in Ex parte McCardle,
Chief Justice Chase for a unanimous Court held
that Congress did have the right and therefore McCardle
was denied his hearing. On the same day, in Texas
v. White, Chase gave the famous decision
saying that no state may secede from the Union.
In these
Reconstruction cases the Court started out strongly
by striking down the military commissions in the non-war
areas and by striking down the Federal Test Act, but
then, probably very slowly, refused to halt enforcement
of Reconstruction Acts and allowed Congress to take
away some of its jurisdiction. More than likely the
Court would have been hurt had it done otherwise, as
the temper of the country was clearly in favor of the
Court's actions, or more properly inactions, in these
cases. Using discretion as the better part of valor,
the Court lived to fight another day.
Harlan
v. the Presidency: Field v. Clark
The final
important nineteenth-century case involving the Court
and the presidency was Field v. Clark in
1892. It was important in that the Court had to face
an upcoming national issue. The issue was the delegation
of Congressional power to the President and his branch,
and the reason it was becoming an issue was because
Congress was delegating more and more. This particular
case concerned the Tariff Act of 1890, in which the
United States worked out reciprocal trade agreements
with other nations, included in which were free imports
of some of those nations' products. The delegation of
power came with a section which authorized the President
to suspend the free entry and impose prescribed duties
if the nation in question was imposing reciprocally
unequal or unreasonable duties on our imports. Justice
John Harlan spoke for the Court in sustaining the act.
He did admit that outright delegation of legislative
power was unconstitutional, but this law did not do
that because the President had nothing to do with the
expediency or the just operation of the law. He had
to suspend existing duties when he ascertained the existence
of a particular fact. Thus, he was obeying the legislative
will rather than making laws himself, and he was not
policy making but rather ascertaining facts.
The standard
set by the Court in this case, accepting reasonable
delegation of power, was used as precedent in most of
the subsequent delegation of power cases. The Court
struck a middle position which enabled the other two
branches, particularly the executive, to more effectively
perform their tasks.
Looking
back upon these nineteenth-century cases, one can see
that the relationship between the President and the
Supreme Court was a fluctuating one due to the lack
of detail surrounding their relationship in the Constitution.
This balance
shown by the Supreme Court in these cases is good because
otherwise our separation of powers principle would not
function effectively. Giving in to the President on
every occasion would mean the Court not performing its
function as it should, but rather being an unequal partner
in government. Conversely, always ruling against the
President would have been the demise of the Court, because
Presidents, especially in wartime situations, would
simply have ignored the Court and the latter would have
been helpless to do anything about it. Thus the Court
has acted wisely and that serves the purpose of enabling
the President and the Supreme Court to coexist as integral
components of the political system of the United States
of America.
Copyright 1976, Supreme Court Historical Society
